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ABSTRACT
One of the major innovations of the World Trade Organization’s
(“WTO”) Dispute Settlement Understanding (“DSU”) is the regulation of
sanctions in response to violations of trade law. The DSU requires governments to receive multilateral approval before suspending trade concessions
and limits the extent of retaliation to prospective damages. In addition, the
DSU permits governments to impose only conditional sanctions: sanctions for
violations that continue after the dispute resolution process is complete. This
enforcement regime creates a remedy gap: governments cannot respond, even
to obvious breaches, until the end of the dispute resolution process (and then
only to the extent of prospective damages). This gap might not be particularly
important if the dispute resolution process were short. In practice, however,
the WTO dispute resolution process has proven increasingly time consuming.
This Article explores the growth of delays in the WTO dispute resolution process and the increasing significance of the remedy gap. It highlights how the
DSU system essentially provides respondent states with an option to violate
trade rules for several years without facing trade retaliation. The remedy gap
also has counterproductive effects on settlement negotiations: the system gives
respondent states few reasons to settle before the end of dispute resolution
unless the states are compensated for doing so. Finally, this system may lead
frustrated complaining states to subvert the DSU regime by acting outside of
the legal framework. This Article discusses several solutions to the remedy
gap, most notably creating a procedure where WTO panels can issue preliminary injunctions.
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INTRODUCTION
Questions regarding the enforcement of trade law focus on a
number of different remedies for violations: the use of trade sanctions,
the effectiveness of informal sanctions, and the reputational costs to
governments. Among these remedies, the systematized use of trade
retaliation (“suspension of trade concessions,” in trade parlance) is
the major innovation of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”).1
Yet the WTO remedy regime contains a significant gap caused by the
length of time that dispute settlement takes at the WTO. The WTO
provides contract-like remedies for continued breaches of WTO rules,
but the remedy is conditional and prospective, beginning only after the
dispute resolution process is complete.2 This gap in the remedy
1 See generally Warren F. Schwartz & Alan O. Sykes, The Economic Structure of Renegotiation and Dispute Resolution in the World Trade Organization, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S179 (2002).
2 See Gavin Goh & Andreas R. Ziegler, Retrospective Remedies in the WTO After Auto-
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scheme creates a de facto escape clause where member states can violate trade rules, and complaining states do not have any right to
rebalance trade concessions for the harm done by the breach from the
time of violation onward. The conditional and prospective nature of
the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding (“DSU”) is well recognized,3 but the effects of the delay are not equally well explored. This
Article examines how this gap in the WTO’s remedial regime has significant negative effects on the efficient functioning of the dispute settlement system. The Article then explores several approaches to
closing the remedy gap, most notably establishing a system through
which DSU panels can issue preliminary injunctions.
The first negative effect of the remedy regime is its creation of a
de facto escape clause for the duration of the legal proceedings, which
allows states to violate WTO law without providing any way for injured states to respond by suspending trade concessions. As the time
necessary to complete the dispute resolution process has lengthened,
this de facto escape clause has grown broader and sometimes more
generous than the WTO’s de jure escape clause, the Safeguards
Agreement.4 Second, the remedy scheme has a counterproductive influence on pretrial settlement negotiations; because the WTO’s dispute settlement system essentially provides the respondent state with
an “option” to violate trade rules for as long as litigation continues,
the respondent state has little incentive to settle the case unless it is
compensated for not exercising this option. Finally, the structure of
the WTO dispute settlement system can give complaining states the
incentive to subvert the regime by acting outside of the legal framework. Complaining states that do not wish to tolerate noncompliance
during the dispute resolution process have few options but to act unilaterally to address trade violations.5 This final effect is potentially the
most significant, because it undermines the WTO’s credibility as an
effective adjudicator of trade disputes.
To be clear, this Article does not claim that states consistently use
the WTO’s dispute resolution process as a means to maintain violations of trade law for as long as possible. States often sincerely negotiate compromises to trade disputes and use the WTO’s adjudication
motive Leather, 6 J. INT’L ECON. L. 545, 548 (2003); Joel Trachtman, The WTO Cathedral, 43
STAN. J. INT’L L. 127, 132–33 (2007).
3

See infra Part I.

Agreement on Safeguards, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, 1869 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter Safeguards Agreement].
4

5

See infra Part I.A.
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process to resolve good faith disagreements concerning the substantive requirements of trade law.6 At the same time, however, states
learn through experience how the WTO system functions and act strategically on that knowledge. The terms on which a state is willing to
settle a dispute depend, in part, on the alternatives. If the dispute
resolution system effectively permits the state to maintain the violation for several years into the future, we would expect this alternative
to influence settlement negotiations. Thus, the remedy gap is relevant
not only to a limited class of “hit-and-run” cases, but also to a much
broader class of disputes in which states are balancing domestic political demands with the obligations of WTO law.
Several options for closing the remedy gap exist. The most obvious is to make damages unconditional and retrospective. If the WTO
system found that a respondent state had violated trade rules, the
complaining government would be able to retaliate against the respondent state for all of the damages incurred even if the respondent
state removed the offending policy. Such a remedy regime would
more closely approximate a contract remedy regime. Yet this solution
has two potential problems. First, WTO member states appear committed to the idea that retaliation should be conditional on the respondent state refusing to alter the successfully challenged policy.7 An
unconditional and retrospective remedy regime would permit retaliation even if the respondent state fully complied with WTO rulings.
Second, unconditional and retrospective remedies would be applied
only at the end of the litigation period. Although this threat is often
(but not always) sufficient to incentivize profit-maximizing firms to
settle disputes, it is significantly less effective with governments.8
Governments often have shorter time horizons and prefer to push the
costs of trade violations onto future governments.9 If WTO adjudication is expected to take four or more years, the current government
may expect that the penalty will be borne by a successor government.
In short, governments evaluate and internalize costs very differently
than do firms, and thus the threat of unconditional and retrospective
damages may not be optimal in encouraging compliance with WTO
rules.
6

See Steve Charnovitz, Rethinking WTO Trade Sanctions, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 792, 809

(2001).
7 Retaliation is disfavored because it further raises barriers to trade, and WTO rules
make explicit that retaliation should only be applied in the face of noncompliance. See id. at
814–15.
8 See infra Part IV.A.
9 See infra Part IV.A.
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An alternative remedy, the one proposed by this Article, is to
institute a procedure by which states may seek preliminary injunctions. At the outset of the WTO dispute resolution’s panel hearing,
the complaining state could request that the panel issue a preliminary
injunction against the respondent state’s policy. The panel would issue the injunction if its preliminary assessment is that the complaining
state is likely to be successful on the merits of its complaint. The respondent state would then be provided with a reasonable period of
time to remove its policy. If it fails to do so, the complaining government could begin retaliating against the respondent government during the litigation process. The panel would authorize a level of
retaliation and could adjust that level based on the likelihood of the
complaining party’s success on the merits of its complaint. Preliminary injunctions have two advantages over contract-style remedies.
First, they preserve the conditionality of the remedy. Retaliation remains conditional on the complaining state failing to comply with the
ruling of the WTO. Second, preliminary injunctions motivate the respondent state’s current government to comply, because retaliation
can be threatened far more quickly, giving the government an incentive to amend their policies or settle the dispute earlier.
This Article explores the source of the remedy gap, the gap’s effects, and some possible ways to close the gap. Part I of the Article
focuses on the source of the gap. The Uruguay Round negotiations
leading to the creation of the DSU reflected the very different goals
that various states had for reforming the dispute resolution system in
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”).10 Some
states, notably the United States, were interested in establishing a
more formal system that would permit trade sanctions, while others,
notably those members of the European Communities (“EC”) and Japan, were interested in restricting the United States’ use of unilateral
sanctions. The resulting institution was a compromise that more easily
authorized the use of trade sanctions—but only after the completion
of the multilateral adjudication process.11 So long as the trading system adjudicated claims quickly, a remedy gap would be small. As the
system has developed, however, the time necessary to complete dispute resolution has grown increasingly lengthy.12
Part I also demonstrates how states have learned to delay dispute
resolution proceedings. Both panels and the Appellate Body regu10
11
12

See infra Part I.A.
See infra Part I.A.
See infra Part I.B.
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larly fail to meet the timelines set out in the DSU. The average time
from the composition of a panel to the adoption of an Appellate Body
report was over two years for cases brought between 2005 and 2009.13
This is more than double the one-year timeline established in the
DSU.14 In addition, states have learned that requests for Article 21.5
compliance panels and appeals can further extend the time until trade
retaliation is authorized.15 Together, these two strategies create a situation where states can effectively delay the end of dispute resolution
for several years. During this time, complaining states have no legal
recourse under WTO rules.
Part II examines the effects of the remedy gap. The remedy gap
is harmful to states on several levels. The lack of remedy for the harm
done to the complaining state during the dispute resolution process is
itself a problem, particularly if the process takes three or more years
to complete. In addition, the remedy gap has a negative influence on
settlement negotiations; the remedy regime is prospective and conditional on continued noncompliance, so respondent states have few
reasons to settle unless they are compensated for doing so. This issue
of settlement also relates to why complaining states have such a high
rate of success at the WTO. Commentators have hypothesized that
the WTO has a free-trade bias because panels and the Appellate Body
so often find in favor of complaining states.16 This study undermines
that hypothesis by highlighting that the remedy gap provides respondent states with an incentive to extend the dispute resolution process
as long as possible. The high win rate at the WTO more likely reflects
the desire of respondent states to litigate cases, even when they expect
to lose, rather than a bias on the part of the WTO.
Part III turns to the question of whether the remedy gap poses a
significant problem to trade law enforcement. International trade
scholars frequently note that the formal remedies at the WTO are not
the only means of enforcing trade law. States that choose to breach
trade rules generally face reputational costs and some informal sanctions. This Part discusses whether these less-formal sanctions are sufficient to solve the problems of trade enforcement caused by the
remedy gap.
See infra Part I.B; infra Table 1.
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 20,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869
U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU].
15 See infra notes 95–99 and accompanying text.
16 Juscelino F. Colares, A Theory of WTO Adjudication: From Empirical Analysis to Biased Rule Development, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 383, 387 (2009).
13
14
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Part IV concludes by considering three ways to alter DSU remedies or dispute settlement procedures to mitigate the effects of the
remedy gap. Although these proposals are not mutually exclusive, the
article presents them separately to highlight the costs and benefits of
each. The first is to change the remedy rule to permit retaliation to
cover the complainant’s total damages, rather than restricting the
remedy to postlitigation prospective damages. The second proposal is
to authorize panels to impose preliminary injunctions at the beginning
of the dispute resolution process. The third proposal would change
the sequencing of the WTO litigation process to allow complaining
governments to retaliate earlier in the litigation process.
I. THE FUNCTIONING OF THE DSU: FROM THE URUGUAY ROUND
NEGOTIATIONS TO CURRENT PRACTICE
A. Uruguay Round Negotiations’ Goals and DSU Remedies
Like any international institution, the WTO dispute settlement
system is the product of compromise. Many states wished to reform
the GATT’s dispute resolution procedures as part of the Uruguay
Round negotiations,17 yet there was a wide range of opinions regarding what form the new regime should take. The United States and
Canadian governments pushed for more radical reform of the GATT
dispute settlement system, including more effective mechanisms for
enforcing trade law.18 The United States, in particular, complained
that the GATT system was unable to credibly threaten sanctions.19
Frustrated with the limits of the GATT system, the United States government had resorted to sanctioning perceived violations of trade
rules or other unfair trading practices unilaterally (the so-called “301
sanctions”).20 The EC and the Japanese governments were less enthusiastic about adopting a rigorous international dispute settlement sysJOHN CROOME, RESHAPING THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: A HISTORY OF THE URUROUND 123 (1995).
18 JOHN H. BARTON ET AL., THE EVOLUTION OF THE TRADE REGIME: POLITICS, LAW,
AND ECONOMICS OF THE GATT AND THE WTO 70 (2006); CROOME, supra note 17, at 149; 2
THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986–1992) 2762 (Terence P. Stewart ed., 1993).
19 See BARTON ET AL., supra note 18, at 69; CROOME, supra note 17, at 149; 2 THE GATT
URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY, supra note 18, at 2726–39, 2763–79.
20 See THOMAS O. BAYARD & KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOTT, RECIPROCITY AND RETALIATION
IN U.S. TRADE POLICY 14–16, 32–40 (1994); Jagdish Bhagwati, Aggressive Unilateralism: An
Overview, in AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM: AMERICA’S 301 TRADE POLICY AND THE WORLD
TRADING SYSTEM 1, 1–2 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Hugh T. Patrick eds., 1990); Robert E. Hudec,
Retaliation Against “Unreasonable” Foreign Trade Practices: The New Section 301 and GATT
Nullification and Impairment, 59 MINN. L. REV. 461, 525–26 (1975); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Edi17
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tem, preferring, at least initially, a more diplomatic approach.21 These
governments were adamant, however, that the dispute settlement system should end the American practice of unilateral sanctioning.22
The resulting institution, the WTO’s DSU, reflected these dual
agendas; it provided mandatory dispute settlement, with sanctions to
be approved only after the process was completed.23 To increase the
institution’s ability to credibly threaten sanctions, the WTO established a system of dispute resolution with strict timelines and nearautomatic adoption of dispute resolution decisions.24 To restrict unilateralism, members of the WTO agreed not to retaliate against violators of trade rules until granted authorization by the WTO, and then
only to the extent and in the form authorized by an arbitration
panel.25
The new WTO system also included an explicit remedy regime.26
If the respondent state failed to bring the challenged measures into
compliance with WTO rules, the Dispute Settlement Body (“DSB”)
would authorize the complaining state to suspend trade concessions
equal to the complaining state’s level of injury from the violation (the
state’s “nullification or impairment,” in WTO parlance).27 The choice
of this remedy rule suggests that, even from the beginning, the governments designing the institution viewed the optimal level of sanctions
for violations as approaching contract law remedies.28 Rather than attorial Comment, Remedies Along with Rights: Institutional Reform in the New GATT, 88 AM. J.
INT’L L. 477, 481 (1994).
21 See CROOME, supra note 17, at 147–51; 2 THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY, supra note 18, at 2727–35.
22 CROOME, supra note 17, at 151, 263; 2 THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING
HISTORY, supra note 18, at 2761–62, 2777–79.
23 DSU art. 23; see also Rachel Brewster, Rule-Based Dispute Resolution in International
Trade Law, 92 VA. L. REV. 251, 256–57 (2006) (discussing the WTO negotiations regarding
dispute settlement).
24 Lowenfeld, supra note 20, at 481.
25 DSU art. 23.
26 This was a significant change to the GATT self-help–remedy regime. See Schwartz &
Sykes, supra note 1, at S200–03.
27 DSU art. 22.4. There is a different remedy for prohibited and actionable subsidies.
With prohibited subsidies, the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement (“SCM
Agreement”) provides for “appropriate countermeasures.” Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures art. 4.10, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, 1869 U.N.T.S. 14 [hereinafter SCM Agreement]. With actionable subsidies, the
standard is “commensurate” countermeasures. Id. art. 4.9.
28 Professors Warren Schwartz and Alan Sykes argue that the WTO system works on contract principles designed to permit breaches of the contract when the political gains from defection are greater than the political costs to the injured states. See Schwartz & Sykes, supra note 1,
at S183 (discussing at length how the WTO works on contract principles); Alan O. Sykes, The
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tempting to deter all breaches of WTO rules (and thereby imposing a
sanction equal to the expected gains from a violation),29 the negotiating governments calibrated the sanctions for breach to the complaining state’s injury.30
Yet the WTO remedy regime has two additional attributes that
deviate from most contract-type remedy regimes: WTO remedies are
both prospective and conditional. First, the WTO rules are widely understood by scholars and WTO arbitration panels to permit only prospective remedies, meaning that trade retaliation must be based
exclusively on the current effects of the violation, not any past effects.31 For instance, in the European Communities — Bananas III
decision, the arbitration panel reviewing Ecuador’s request for trade
remedies found that retaliation against the EC could only be based on
injuries to Ecuador after the EC’s failure to comply with the DSB ruling, not from the start of the violation.32
Remedy for Breach of Obligations Under the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: Damages
or Specific Performance?, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: ESSAYS IN
HONOUR OF JOHN H. JACKSON 347 (Marco Bronckers & Reinhard Quick eds., 2000); see also
Thomas Sebastian, World Trade Organization Remedies and the Assessment of Proportionality:
Equivalence and Appropriateness, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 337, 365–67 (2007) (discussing various
goals of WTO remedies while observing that these sanctions are often insufficient to induce
compliance ex ante or ex post); Rufus Yerxa, The Power of the WTO Dispute Settlement System,
in KEY ISSUES IN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: THE FIRST TEN YEARS 3, 4 (Rufus Yerxa &
Bruce Wilson eds., 2005) (noting that “the [WTO] dispute settlement system works on the basis
of contractual remedies”).
The level of retaliation needed to deter the breach is equal to the gains the state has
accrued over the life of the policy (or greater if the probability of the sanction being imposed is
less than one), while the level of retaliation needed to convince the state to come into compliance with trade law is equal to the state’s present gains from the breach. See George W. Downs,
David M. Rocke & Peter N. Barsoom, Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About
Cooperation?, 50 INT’L ORG. 379, 384–86 (1996); Shannon K. Mitchell, GATT, Dispute Settlement and Cooperation: A Note, 9 ECON. & POL. 87, 89–92 (1985) (noting that the DSU cannot
deter breaches because it does not eliminate the gains from defection).
29

30 Schwartz & Sykes, supra note 1, at S188; Sykes, supra note 28, at 351; see also John H.
Jackson, International Law Status of WTO Dispute Settlement: Obligation to Comply or Option to
“Buy Out”?, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 109, 123 (2004) (acknowledging that the damages remedy does
not deter breach but arguing against the idea that the DSU provides states with the option to
accept retaliation and refuse compliance).
31 Goh & Ziegler, supra note 2, at 564. The Automotive Leather decision is the lone DSU
ruling that provided retrospective remedies, in that case, for a one-time subsidy. Panel Report,
Australia — Subsidies Provided to Producers and Exporters of Automotive Leather, WT/DS126/
RW (Jan. 21, 2000). The WTO membership was generally critical of the decision and no WTO
arbitration panel has recommended retrospective damages. Goh & Ziegler, supra note 2, at 547.
32 Decision by the Arbitrators, European Communities — Regime for the Importation, Sale
and Distribution of Bananas — Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities Under
Article 22.6 of the DSU (EC Bananas III), WT/DS27/ARB/ECU (Mar. 24, 2000).
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The WTO remedy regime has a second requirement that sanctions only be “temporary measures available in the event that the recommendations or rulings [of the DSB] are not implemented within a
reasonable period of time.”33 WTO arbitration panels have interpreted this “conditional” requirement to forbid sanctions when the
violation has been removed, even if the effects of the violations continue.34 Thus if a state removes a challenged measure at the end of
dispute resolution, the complaining states may not sanction the
breaching state for its violation even if the effects of the violation persist (i.e., through previously granted subsidies or a government procurement decision).35 Interestingly, the conditional requirement
means that it is impossible for states to deter breach, even an “inefficient breach,” through formal sanctions via the DSU.36 Deterrence is
impossible because a respondent state can always eliminate the threat
of any formal sanctions by complying with the DSU ruling at the end
of the dispute resolution process.
Based on the WTO remedy regime, it appears that the designers
of the DSU recognized that there would be some remedy gap. Damages are contingent on continued noncompliance with the WTO ruling, and so there was always the possibility that complaining states
would suffer some harm from the violation that would not be redressed if the respondent state ceased its violation. However, the
DSU art. 22.1.
For instance, in the United States — Subsidies on Upland Cotton dispute, the Article
21.5 panel refused to allow Brazil to impose trade retaliation for a U.S. program that was removed after the reasonable period of time set by the DSB had expired. Decision by the Arbitrators, United States — Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/ARB/2 (Aug. 31, 2009). But see
Goh & Ziegler, supra note 2, at 546–47 (discussing the panel decision in the Automotive Leather
case).
35 The requirement that retaliation be conditional has influenced the interpretation of the
prospective element of the remedy rule by focusing the attention on the effects of the current
violation and ignoring past violations. The current understanding that the WTO only provides
prospective remedies is not required by the text of the DSU. The conditional requirement does
not demand that trade retaliation, when applied, be prospective. The remedy rule that trade
retaliation be equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment could be interpreted to include current and past harms to the complaining party. The sanctions would still be conditional,
as the trade retaliation would only be authorized only if and so long as the respondent state
refuses to comply with an adverse ruling. Arguably, this is a more natural reading of the remedy
standard, as the text does not exclude past harms. Nevertheless, this is not the interpretation
generally used by WTO arbitration panels. See, e.g., Decision by the Arbitrators, United States
— Upland Cotton, supra note 34, ¶¶ 2.2, 5.77, 6.5; Decision by the Arbitrator, United States —
Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, ¶ 1.3, WT/DS285/
ARB (Dec. 21, 2007); Decision by the Arbitrators, EC Bananas III, supra note 32, ¶¶ 171,
173–76.
36 See Trachtman, supra note 2, at 129; see also Mitchell, supra note 29, at 89–92.
33
34
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remedy gap was designed to be narrow. As envisioned by the member
states and set out in the DSU text, panels are supposed to take six
months to issue a report37 and appeals are to take sixty days.38 Were
these time limits met, the detrimental effects of the remedy gap would
be minimal.
Today, the time required for WTO dispute settlement has expanded dramatically and the remedy gap is far wider than the designers of the system seem to have anticipated. Instead of a brief delay
between the request for a panel and a final resolution of the case,
dispute resolution before the WTO can now continue for several
years. By expanding the remedy gap, this situation poses significant
practical problems for the WTO: it leaves states without any remedy,
even for obvious trade law violations, for years at a time and threatens
to undermine member states’ support for the DSU system.
B. The WTO’s Dispute Resolution Process
Although it was designed to be a relatively quick process, in practice, WTO dispute settlement can easily take three years or longer to
complete. The first part of this Section describes the many proceedings in the adjudication process and reviews the timeline as specified
in the DSU and as it works in practice. The second part discusses how
states have learned to use the litigation delays and the compliance
stage of adjudication to extend the dispute resolution process.
1. The Treaty’s Description of the DSU Process
The DSU creates the WTO’s dispute settlement system and provides the WTO’s DSB with compulsory jurisdiction to hear claims regarding violations of WTO rules.39 The DSB consists of the entire
membership of the WTO sitting in a dispute settlement role. If one
member state wishes to bring a complaint against the actions of another member state, the complaining party brings the dispute to the
DSB and requests consultations. The disputing parties engage in consultation for at least sixty days.40 If consultations fail to resolve the
dispute within that time, the complaining state may request the forma37 DSU art. 12.9 (providing that panels reports should be issued within six months, nine
months at the longest).
38 Id. art. 17.5 (providing that Appellate Body reports should be issued within sixty days,
ninety days at the longest).
39 Id. art. 1.1 (stating that dispute settlement rules apply any dispute between members
concerning their rights and obligations under the WTO agreement); id. art. 3.1 (affirming the
members’ agreement to adhere to the rules of the dispute settlement understanding).
40 Id. art. 4. The parties can obviously communicate informally without officially request-
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tion of a panel to hear the dispute.41 Upon receiving a request for a
panel, the DSB must decide whether to begin the (surprisingly long)
adjudicative process. The DSB makes this decision by reverse consensus,42 meaning that the case will proceed to an adjudicatory panel unless there is a consensus among the members of the DSB, including
the interested parties, not to do so.43
The DSU dispute resolution process has three stages, and the
parties can settle the case at any point.44 The first stage is the “adjudication” phase, where a panel of three arbitrators chosen by the parties45 receives evidence from both parties and issues a ruling of fact
and law.46 The panel process is designed to take no longer than six
months,47 but panels often exceed this timeline in complex cases.48
When the panel reaches its initial decision, it circulates the report to
ing consultations. Many trade disputes (or potential disputes) are probably resolved this way
and never reach the WTO’s radar screen.
41 Id. art. 4.7. The timeframe can be shorter in special situations, such as when the dispute
involves perishable goods. Id. art. 4.8. If the responding party entirely fails to engage in consultation, then the complaining party can request a panel in thirty days. Id. art. 4.3. The complaining party can choose to continue consultations after sixty days. Alternatively, it is can
request good offices, conciliation, or mediation. See id. art. 5.2. The complaining party is under
no obligation to proceed to a panel. See id. art. 6.2 (noting that the complaining party must
officially request the formation of a panel).
42 The term “reverse consensus” has its origins in the GATT dispute resolution process.
The early practice in the GATT regime was that a case would not be referred to a panel for
adjudication unless the membership of the GATT—including the responding party—reached a
consensus that it should go forward. Thus, in the early days of the GATT, the responding party
had the option of vetoing the dispute resolution process. What is surprising is that the responding party often did not. Later GATT practice gave parties the “right” to a panel. However, the
process of adopting a panel decision was still based on consensus, meaning that the responding
party could block the adoption of the final report. Again, parties often did not block the adoption of the report even though it was in their power to do so. See generally ROBERT HUDEC,
ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE EVOLUTION OF THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM
(1993).
The term “reverse consensus” is derived from the idea that the WTO was reversing the
GATT consensus rule. All members—including the complaining state—would have to object to
the establishment of a panel to stop the dispute resolution process. To be exact, the responding
state could delay the formation of the panel temporarily. If the responding state objects to the
formation of the panel at the DSB meeting, then the matter is tabled until the next meeting. At
that point, the respondent’s objection cannot prevent the DSB decision by reverse consensus to
begin the adjudicatory process.
43 DSU art. 6.1.
44 See id. arts. 8, 21, 22.
45 Id. art. 8.5. Alternatively, the panel can be composed of five arbitrators if the parties so
chose. See id.
46 Id. art. 11 (placing an obligation on panels to make an objective assessment of the facts
before it).
47 Id. art. 12.8.
48 See, e.g., Panel Report, European Communities and Certain Member States — Measures
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the parties, and the parties have an opportunity to make comments or
suggestions.49 The panel’s final report is directed to the DSB, which
adopts the report by reverse consensus (it adopts the panel report unless there is consensus against the report)50 unless one of the parties
announces its intention to appeal.51
Either or both of the parties can appeal the arbitrator’s decision
on issues of law to the Appellate Body, a standing body of judges.52
The appeals process is designed to take no longer than sixty days
(ninety days in exceptional cases),53 but several appeals have taken
longer than ninety days.54 The Appellate Body does not have the
power to remand a case to the adjudicatory panel for rehearing or to
make additional evidentiary findings, so the Appellate Body’s decision is the end of the adjudication phase.55 The DSB votes to adopt
the Appellate Body report by the reverse consensus rule.56 In the fifteen-year history of the WTO, the DSB has never failed to adopt an
Appellate Body report.57 If the Appellate Body report finds that the
respondent state has violated the WTO agreements,58 then the respondent state may announce its intention to comply,59 and the DSB proAffecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316/R (June 30, 2010) (showing that the request
for consultation was first made six years earlier, on October 6, 2004).
49

DSU art. 15.

See James Bacchus, Lone Star: The Historic Role of the WTO, 39 TEX. INT’L L.J. 401,
408 n.21 (2004); see also Lowenfeld, supra note 20, at 480 (describing the negotiations that ultimately resulted in the reverse consensus procedure).
50

51 DSU art. 16.4. The responding party (or any other member) can object to the report at
its first presentation to the DSB. Id. art. 16.2. An objection blocks the adoption of the report
for one meeting. Id. At the next meeting of the DSB, the panel report is either adopted or
rejected. Id. art. 16.4.
52 Id. art. 17.1–.2. A three-judge panel of Appellate Body members hears the appeal. Id.
art. 17.1. The WTO agreements have no provision for the Appellate Body to sit en banc. Appellate Body members serve for a four-year term that may be renewed by the membership once.
Id. art. 17.2.
53

Id. art. 17.5.

54

See infra notes 59–60 and accompanying text.

DSU art. 17.13 (stating only that the Appellate Body may “uphold, modify or reverse”
the panel’s conclusions, but not remand); see also Joost Pauwelyn, The Use of Experts in WTO
Dispute Settlement, 51 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 325, 336 (2002) (recommending that the Appellate
Body be given the power to remand cases).
55

56

DSU art. 17.14.

57

See Bacchus, supra note 50, at 408 n.21.

Technically, there can be either a violation of the WTO agreements or a “nullification or
impairment” of the complaining members’ benefits under the agreement. See DSU art. 26.1.
This Article uses the term “violation” to refer to both for ease of exposition.
58

59 States almost always declare their intention to comply even when compliance is not
forthcoming. See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
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vides the responding government with a reasonable period of time in
which to do so—typically no longer than fifteen months.60
The second stage of the dispute resolution process is the “compliance” phase, in which the responding government reports to the DSB
the actions that it has taken to comply with the ruling.61 Respondent
governments can claim that they are in compliance after taking little
or no action to alter the challenged policy.62 If the complaining government disagrees that the responding state is in compliance, then the
complaining government can request a compliance panel to evaluate
the sufficiency of the respondent state’s actions. Like the adjudication
panel, the compliance panel is composed of three arbitrators selected
by the parties. One or both parties can appeal the compliance panel’s
ruling to the Appellate Body. If the Appellate Body finds that the
violation is ongoing, then the DSB recommends that the respondent
state comply with the Appellate Body’s ruling within a reasonable period of time.
The timing of the compliance phase in the adjudicatory process
remains a point of contention.63 The DSU text provides for the compliance panel to monitor the respondent state’s compliance with any
DSB decision but does not provide a timeframe for when the compliance phase should be initiated—specifically, whether it should occur
before or after the DSB’s authorization to suspend concessions.64 This
uncertainty regarding the timing of the compliance panel has been referred to as the “sequencing problem.”65 Member states have enDSU art. 21.3.
Id. art. 21.
62 For instance, the United States claimed that it was in compliance with the Appellate
Body’s ruling in the United States — Gambling case based on a letter from the Attorney General’s office that reiterated the United States’ legal position during the adjudication phase. See
Status Report by the United States, Addendum, United States — Measures Affecting the CrossBorder Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/15/Add.1 (Apr. 11, 2006) (noting
that the Justice Department confirmed the position of the U.S. government, and that the United
States was therefore in compliance with the DSB rulings).
63 See, e.g., Recourse by the United States to Article 22.2 of the DSU, European Communities — Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/43 (Jan. 14,
1999) (noting that the “reasonable period of time” in which to conform with the EC’s obligations
had passed).
64 DSU art. 21. Professor Petros Mavroidis has argued that it is possible to resolve the
issue without amendment by reading Article 21.5 and Article 22.6 together to require that requests for the suspension of concessions be made only if there is no action to comply or the
action has been determined to be insufficient by an Article 21.5 panel. See Petros C. Mavroidis,
Remedies in the WTO Legal System: Between a Rock and a Hard Place, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 763,
796 (2000).
65 Cherise M. Valles & Brendan P. McGivern, The Right to Retaliate Under the WTO
Agreement: The “Sequencing” Problem, 34 J. WORLD TRADE 63, 63 (2000).
60
61
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gaged in multilateral negotiations to resolve the dilemma for over a
decade without resolution.66
The sequencing issue is particularly important when considering
the third stage of the dispute resolution process, the “remedy stage.”
If the Appellate Body finds that the respondent government is still in
violation of the WTO agreements after the compliance stage, then the
complaining government can request that the DSB authorize the suspension of trade benefits to the respondent state.67 The respondent
state can—and almost always does—object to the extent and the form
of the suspension.68 The DSB will then establish a panel to determine
the maximum extent and the possible forms of the suspension.69 The
panel determines the level of sanctions based on the extent to which
the violating policy (as it currently exists) nullifies or impairs the complaining state’s benefits under the agreement.70 The panel also determines the form of the trade retaliation; suspension can be in the same
sector as the violation, in a different sector (but within the same
agreement), or in a different agreement.71 The parties cannot appeal
this ruling. The DSB adopts the arbitration panel’s decision by reverse consensus and authorizes the complaining government to suspend trade concessions to the level (and in the form) authorized by
the arbitration panel.72 It is only after the third stage that a complaining party can retaliate by suspending trade concessions to the respondent state.73 Because the complaining state can only retaliate
after the adjudication and compliance phases, the period of time that
the respondent state can violate WTO obligations without formal consequences is longer than if retaliation were permitted after the adjudication phase.74
66 In 1999, the Canadian government proposed replacing Article 21 of the DSU with Article 21bis, which would require that states refrain from requesting the suspension of concessions
until the Article 21bis procedure was completed. Id. at 82–83. As of this writing, the member
states have not adopted an amendment to cure the sequencing issue.
67 DSU art. 22.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id. art. 22.3 (discussing when different forms of retaliation are permitted). “Sectoral
retaliation” refers to the sectors in the General Agreement on Trade in Service (“GATS”) and
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”) (all goods
are considered to be in the same sector under the GATT agreement). See id. “Across agreement retaliation” refers to complaining state actions that withdraw benefits in an agreement
(GATT, GATS, or TRIPS) other than the one the violation was in. See id.
72 DSU art. 22.
73 Id.
74 See SIMON LESTER & BRYAN MERCURIO, WORLD TRADE LAW: TEXTS, MATERIALS
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2. The DSU Process in Practice
The result of these three separate phases of dispute resolution is
that the WTO process is often lengthy. This is in contrast to the common representation that dispute settlement at the WTO is swift, taking under a year and a half.75 For instance, the WTO itself represents
the system of dispute resolution as fast, explaining:
The [Uruguay Round] agreement emphasizes that prompt
settlement is essential if the WTO is to function effectively.
It sets out in considerable detail the procedures and the
timetable to be followed in resolving disputes. If a case runs
its full course to a first ruling, it should not normally take
more than about one year—15 months if the case is
appealed.76
Yet, many WTO cases can take well over fifteen months to complete. The extreme examples are the Airbus and Boeing subsidy disputes. The United States and the EC each filed complaints about the
other’s subsidies to their domestic aircraft industries.77 Both parties
eventually requested the establishment of a panel to hear the case.
The United States’ request for a panel was made in May 2005 and the
EC’s request was made in January 2006.78 The Airbus panel issued its
initial ruling on June 30, 2010, some five years later.79 The EC has
announced its intention to appeal, and the WTO Appellate Body already signaled that it expects significant delays in issuing its ruling.80
The Boeing panel issued its report in January 2011, five years after the
panel was established.81 The United States has not yet declared
whether it intends to appeal. Although this pair of cases may be
unique in terms of the extent of the delay, the cases are not unique in
COMMENTARY 172–74 (2008) (discussing the dispute between the United States and the
European Communities over sequencing).
75 See Amelia Porges, The WTO and the New Dispute Settlement, 88 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L.
PROC. 131, 134 (1994) (asserting that the timetable in which reports must be issued is of “unheard-of brevity” compared to other international proceedings).
76 See Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://
www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2011).
77 Daniel Pruzin, EU Submits Revised WTO Request for Consultation on Boeing Subsidies,
WTO Rep. Online (BNA) (June 30, 2005).
78 Daniel Pruzin, U.S., EU Ask WTO to Appoint Panelists in Airbus-Boeing Disputes over
Subsidies, WTO Rep. Online (BNA) (Oct. 11, 2005).
79 Daniel Pruzin, WTO Panel Ruling Slams Illegal Subsidies for Europe’s Airbus in Case
Brought by U.S., WTO Rep. Online (BNA) (July 1, 2010).
80 Daniel Pruzin, WTO Signals Long Delay in Issuing Ruling on EU’s Appeal Against
Airbus Decision, WTO Rep. Online (BNA) (Sept. 23, 2010).
81 Daniel Pruzin, WTO Panel Issues Final Ruling Siding in Part With EU Claims of U.S.
Subsidy for Boeing, WTO Rep. Online (BNA) (Feb. 1, 2011).
AND
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terms of the WTO system failing to meet the time limits set out in the
DSU.
To get a better grasp of the overall extent of the delay and the
trend toward greater delays, Table 1 provides information on the average amount of time elapsed from the establishment of a panel to the
DSB’s adoption of the report over three different time periods: the
first five years of the DSU (1995–1999), the second five years
(2000–2004), and the third five years (2005–2009).82 The DSB adopts
a dispute settlement report after the panel report is issued when the
parties do not appeal.83 If there is an appeal, the DSB adopts the
report after the Appellate Body report is issued.84 This procedure applies to both the merits stage and the compliance stage of the dispute
resolution process.85
According to DSU rules, it should take no longer than nine
months (twelve months at the extreme) from the establishment of the
panel to the adoption of the report by the DSB, when the parties do
not appeal.86 When there is an appeal of a panel report, the whole
process should take no longer than twelve months (sixteen months at
the extreme).87 Table 1 provides information on the average time
from the establishment of a panel to the adoption of the DSB’s report
for all four categories: merits panel without an appeal, merits panel
82 All data is taken from WorldTradeLaw.net’s statistics on WTO dispute resolution. Time
Between Panel Establishment and Adoption of WTO Panel/AB Reports, WORLDTRADELAW.NET,
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/dsc/database/adoptiontiming1.asp (last visited June 4, 2011).
83 See Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes, supra note 76.
84 Id.
85 DSU art. 16 (merits); id. art. 21 (compliance).
86 Under DSU rules, the panel should issue its report within six months of the establishment of the panel. Id. art. 12.8. In no case should the panel take more than nine months to issue
its report. Id. art. 12.9. Any interim review of the panel report is supposed to be included in the
six-month time period set out in Article 12.8. Id. art. 15.3. Once the panel report is issued, the
report is circulated to all WTO members. Id. art. 15.2. The DSB must vote on adopting the
report within sixty days of the report’s circulation. Id. art. 16.4.
All told, the process should take no longer than nine months: six months for the panel
report, one month to circulate the report, and two months for the DSB to vote on the report. In
no case should the process take longer than twelve months: nine months for the panel report,
one month to circulate the report, and two months for the DSB to vote on the report.
87 When there is an appeal, the DSB does not consider the adoption of the panel report.
Under DSU rules, the Appellate Body report should be issued within sixty days of a party’s
announcement of intention to appeal. Id. art. 17.5. In no case should the Appellate Body take
more than ninety days to issue its report. Id. The DSB must vote on adopting the Appellate
Body’s report within thirty days of the report being circulated to the members. Id. art. 17.14.
In total, the panel and appeals process (including the vote by the DSB) should take no
longer than twelve months. Id. art. 20. Where the panel and the Appellate Body have taken the
maximum extended time to issue their reports (respectively, three additional months and thirty
additional days), the process should taken no longer than sixteen months to complete.
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the adoption of a merits stage panel report by the DSB in all three
periods has averaged over nine months. The trend is toward greater
delays. In the 1995–1999 period, the average time necessary to adopt
a panel report was fourteen months. By the 2005–2009 time period,
the average time was up to seventeen months, almost double the time
allocated by the DSU text.
The same trend toward greater delays is true with appeals. In all
three time periods, the average time necessary to hear a merits-stage
appeal was greater than twelve months. During the 1995–1999 period,
the average time for the DSB to adopt an Appellate Body report was
over sixteen months. By the 2005–2009 period, the average time increased to nearly twenty-five months, more than double the time allocated by the DSU text.
The compliance stage for both panels and appeals has not experienced notable delays, although it demonstrates a trend toward longer
adjudication times.89 In the 1995–2000 period, compliance panel reports that were not appealed were adopted by the DSB in five months
on average. Compliance panel reports that were appealed took an
average of 7.8 months to be adopted by the DSB. By the 2005–2009
period, the average time elapsed from the establishment of the compliance panel to the adoption of the panel’s report by the DSB was 9.5
months with no appeal, and over 16 months when there was an
appeal.
Delay, by itself, is not necessarily a major concern for dispute
resolution systems. In fact, the time period necessary for WTO dispute resolution to function is not extreme by either domestic or international dispute resolution standards. Delay is important in the
context of the WTO because none of the damage done during the dispute resolution process is subject to a remedy. Unlike domestic litigation, where damages are traced to and calculated from the beginning
of a violation and subject to interest,90 the WTO remedy regime does
means between the samples and within the samples. The F-tests for the samples in the four
categories (merits panel without an appeal, merits panel with an appeal, compliance panel without an appeal, and compliance panel with an appeal) are all significant at the 0.01 level. This
allows us to reject the hypothesis that there is no difference between the three time periods in
any one of the four categories with 99% confidence. However, the F-test does not tell us what is
causing the difference between the samples.
89 Table 1 provides information on the time needed to complete various stages of the dispute resolution process. The data presented here include all compliance panels and appeals,
even if those panels occurred after an authorization for the suspension of concessions.
90 See generally Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Law: Damage
Measures for Breach of Contract, in 3 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 1661, 1708–10 (Alan J.
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not provide states with any remedy for the injuries incurred from the
time of the violation to the authorization to suspend concessions.91 As
explored more fully in Part II, the WTO’s remedy regime thus makes
DSU delays far more significant than dispute resolution delays in
other systems.
This trend toward longer dispute resolution delays is consistent
with some academic and popular discussions of the increased complexity of cases before the WTO.92 Complaints certainly take longer
to resolve if the case is complex, but complexity is not entirely exogenous to the litigation strategy of the parties. While some cases are
inherently more complex than others, much of the complexity in a
case comes from the selection and presentation of issues raised by the
parties. The more defenses a respondent state offers and the more
documents submitted to the panel, the more complex the case becomes. Many respondent states have learned how to increase the
complexity of a case (and thus the time necessary to adjudicate the
case) as a means of delay.93 The remedy gap essentially rewards this
strategy by allowing a respondent state to maintain the domestic benefits of the challenged policy for a longer period of time without exposing itself to a higher damage award.
In addition to creating delays, respondent states have learned to
extend the dispute resolution process through the increased use of
compliance panels under Article 21.5. The appropriate use and timing
of a compliance panel is still a matter of controversy. Scholars have
described the drafting of Article 21.5 as “careless” because it does not
set out the role of the compliance stage in the overall dispute resoluAuerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 2002) (providing a review of the goal of contract damages);
Steven Shavell, Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 11 BELL J. ECON. 466 (1980).
91 See, e.g., Decision by the Arbitrators, EC Bananas III, supra note 32, ¶ 171.
92 See, e.g., William J. Davey, The WTO Dispute Settlement System, 3 J. INT’L ECON. L. 15,
16 (2000); Isabelle Van Damme, Eighth Annual WTO Conference: An Overview, 12 J. INT’L
ECON. L 175, 184 (2009) (reviewing the discussion of trade law professionals); see also Chad P.
Bown & Bernard M. Hoekman, WTO Dispute Settlement and the Missing Developing Country
Cases: Engaging the Private Sector, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L 861, 870 (2005) (dividing legal fees for
WTO cases into low- and high-complexity categories).
93 See Gary Horlick & Judith Coleman, The Compliance Problems of the WTO, 24 ARIZ.
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 141, 142 (2007) (“Even assuming, charitably, that all WTO Members act in
good faith to fulfill their obligations, and that they only discover they are in violation after an
Appellate Body ruling, there are numerous cases where the post–Appellate Body process
stretches on for years. Again, this is not just one or two Members—it is obvious that numerous
governments are deciding to ‘game the system’ and string out non-compliance for as long as
possible. (And this ignores the numerous delays in litigation before the Appellate Body rulings—it is fascinating to hear lawyers for Members state openly that they are taking every delay
they can.).”).
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Table 2 categorizes the compliance panel data based on when the
state requested the initial compliance panel, not when the original
merits panel was requested. This reflects the idea that governments
are learning the strategies of navigating the WTO dispute resolution
process through experience.98 States can learn from other cases (particularly regarding the use of compliance panels) even after the initial
complaint has been filed. For instance, the WTO did not receive a
single request for a compliance panel until December 15, 1998, when
the EC requested one regarding its dispute with Ecuador over the
EC’s banana import regime.99 This was not for lack of litigation at the
young institution: by this time, eighteen panel reports and fifteen Appellate Body reports had already been issued (not including the
European Communities — Bananas disputes). After the EC made its
compliance panel request, however, the DSB had established four additional compliance panels within a year’s time.100
An alternative way to analyze member states’ use of compliance
panels is to divide the data into five-year time periods starting from
the “innovation” of the request by the EC for a compliance panel in
the European Communities — Bananas (Ecuador) dispute. The idea
is that the states only fully understood that compliance panels could
be part of the dispute resolution process after the EC made such a
request in December 1998. Table 3 presents the data on the use of
compliance panels and the rates of appeal for the first five years
(1999–2003) and second five years (2004–2009) of DSU dispute
resolution.

the figure because the compliance “II” cases have been excluded. For an explanation on the
exclusion of these cases, see supra note 96.
98 There is a rich political science literature on state learning. See generally ROBERT P.
JERVIS, PERCEPTION AND MISPERCEPTION IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 217–87 (1976) (discussing models of learning); JACK SNYDER, MYTHS OF EMPIRE: DOMESTIC POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL AMBITION (1991) (discussing models of learning of imperial expansion); Jack S. Levy,
Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield, 48 INT’L ORG. 279 (1994) (reviewing models of state learning and critiquing the literature); Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Nuclear Learning and U.S.-Soviet Security Regimes, 41 INT’L ORG. 371, 372–73 (1987) (discussing models of
learning in security issues).
99 Dispute Settlement: Dispute DS27, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Dec. 11, 2008), http://
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds27_e.htm. Ecuador (the complaining state)
similarly made a request for a compliance panel three days later, on December 18, 1998. Id.
100 Time Between Panel Establishment and Adoption of WTO Panel/AB Reports, supra
note 82.
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six and one half years.102 What was originally expected to be a relatively small remedy gap has grown significantly as states learn to extend the dispute resolution process.
II. THE REMEDY GAP: NONCOMPLIANCE DURING
DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESS

THE

The remedy gap is not simply a theoretical problem. The inability
of complaining states to obtain any remedy from the harms of trade
violations for years at a time disrupts the WTO trading system. This
Part discusses the problems posed by the remedy gap in more detail.
The first Section highlights how the remedy gap creates a large and
significant loophole in the trade rules. It effectively provides a de
facto escape clause to trade obligations that is more generous than the
WTO’s de jure escape clause, the Safeguards Agreement. The second
Section discusses the remedy gap’s effects on settlements. Even
where respondent states do not drag out dispute resolution, their ability to do so influences settlement negotiations. States bargain in the
shadow of the remedy rule and thus the remedy gap can affect settlements, making a settlement more favorable to respondent states than
it would be without the remedy gap. The third Section discusses how
the growing remedy gap creates an incentive for complaining states to
act outside of the WTO framework. This is potentially a problem for
the WTO system because it undermines the system’s credibility.
A. Creating a De Facto Escape Clause
The most obvious effect of the DSU institutional design is that it
creates a de facto escape clause. The WTO remedy rule creates a situation where the respondent state can violate WTO trade rules for as
long as dispute resolution continues without facing retaliation. To put
this effect in context, it is useful to compare the de facto escape clause
created by the remedy gap to the WTO Safeguards Agreement.103 International relations scholars and international lawyers often model
the Safeguards Agreement as a de jure escape clause, an institutional
design element that adds flexibility to the regime’s substantive
obligations.104
102 The initial panel was composed on May 19, 2003. The DSB adopted the Article 22.6
arbitration panel’s decision to allow Brazil to retaliate on November 19, 2009.
103 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
104 See generally GEORGE W. DOWNS & DAVID M. ROCKE, OPTIMAL IMPERFECTION?: DOMESTIC UNCERTAINTY AND INSTITUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 76–104 (1995); Kyle
Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, Enforcement, Private Political Pressure, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization Escape Clause, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 471
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When the political costs of compliance with an international
agreement become too onerous for national leaders, the Safeguards
Agreement provides domestic officials with a means of adjusting their
international obligations.105 In designing an escape clause, states want
to permit members to violate the agreement when the political consequences of compliance are dire, while otherwise restricting escape.106
The Safeguards Agreement strikes this balance by permitting governments to raise trade barriers unilaterally when an unforeseen increase
in imports threatens to cause serious injury to a domestic industry.107
When this standard is met, WTO rules allow a government to impose
protection for up to four years without the obligation to compensate
other parties.108 For the first three years that a safeguard is in effect,
other governments are not entitled to rebalance trade obligations (for
instance, by raising their trade barriers against the state that is imposing the safeguard) if there has been an absolute increase in the relevant import.109 Although the benefits of the safeguard are
considerable to the government invoking the safeguard, there are significant restrictions as well.110 First, safeguard requirements are difficult to meet; the government must demonstrate that there is an
increase in imports and that this increase is a cause of serious injury
(or threatens serious injury) to the domestic industry.111 Second, safeguards must be progressively liberalized.112 Finally, safeguards can
only be imposed for a four-year period, renewable once for an additional four years,113 and no additional restrictions are permitted.114
(2005); B. Peter Rosendorff & Helen V. Milner, The Optimal Design of International Trade
Institutions: Uncertainty and Escape, 55 INT’L ORG. 829 (2001); Alan O. Sykes, Protectionism as a
“Safeguard”: A Positive Analysis of the GATT “Escape Clause” with Normative Speculations, 58
U. CHI. L. REV. 255 (1991).
105

See Rosendorff & Milner, supra note 104, at 829.

106

Sykes, supra note 104, at 278–85.

See LESTER & MERCURIO, supra note 74, at 521–23 (discussing several rationales for
restricting the importation of fairly traded goods); MITSUO MATSUSHITA ET AL., THE WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION: LAW, PRACTICE, AND POLICY 438–39 (2d ed. 2006) (same).
107

108

Safeguards Agreement art. 7.1.

Id. art. 8.3. The limit on rebalancing only applies if the safeguard measure is conforming. See LESTER & MERCURIO, supra note 74, at 551–52.
109

110

Bagwell & Staiger, supra note 104, at 473–76; Sykes, supra note 104, at 286–89.

111

Safeguards Agreement arts. 2.1, 4.1.

Id. art. 7.4; see also LESTER & MERCURIO, supra note 74, at 550 (discussing application
of safeguards).
112

113 Safeguards Agreement art. 7.1, .3. Developing countries can extend a safeguard for an
additional two years. Id. art. 9.2.
114

Id. art. 7.4–.5.
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By contrast, the remedy gap creates an escape clause that is much
broader in scope and sometimes more generous in its benefits. First,
the DSU process applies to nearly all violations of any WTO agreement.115 Unlike the Safeguards Agreement, the DSU has no causation or serious injury requirement, and thus lacks an ex ante filter
regarding what conditions need to be satisfied to make use of the escape clause.116 Second, there is no obligation to progressively liberalize the restrictions; governments can effectively maintain the
restriction in the same form for as long as dispute resolution continues. Third, there is no set time limit for how long the government can
keep the measure in place.117 The Safeguards Agreement establishes
a four-year (at most eight-year) limit,118 while DSU design (although
formally prohibiting violations of trade rules) effectively permits any
state to violate trade rules for as long as the respondent state can drag
out the dispute resolution process. Finally, the remedy gap does not
permit governments to rebalance concessions, as the Safeguards
Agreement does,119 even if the dispute resolution process goes on for
longer than three years.
The result is that the structure of the DSU creates the odd situation where member states may be better off avoiding resort to the
Safeguards Agreement and relying instead on DSU procedures for
safeguard-type actions. States may prefer to refrain from labeling
their measure a safeguard because the de facto escape clause may be
more generous in delaying when complaining states can rebalance.
Under the Safeguards Agreement, states can rebalance as soon as the
claimed safeguard is found to be nonconforming.120 By contrast, the
DSU does not permit rebalancing on any nonsafeguard violation until
the DSB authorizes the suspension of concessions.121
The difference is highlighted in two safeguard cases between the
EC and the United States. In the first, the United States — Wheat
Gluten dispute, the EC challenged the United States’ use of a safeguard measure to raise tariffs on wheat gluten.122 The EC requested
consultations in March 1999 and requested the formation of a panel
See DSU art. 23.
See id.
117 See id.
118 Safeguards Agreement art. 7.1–.3.
119 Id. art. 8.3.
120 LESTER & MERCURIO, supra note 74, at 551–52.
121 DSU art. 23.2(c).
122 Daniel Pruzin, WTO Panel Expected to Delay Ruling on U.S. Wheat Gluten Safeguard,
WTO Rep. Online (BNA) (Apr. 20, 2000).
115
116
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that June.123 The panel issued its report in July 2000, finding that the
American use of the safeguard measure was a violation of the Safeguards Agreement.124 The United States appealed the ruling and the
Appellate Body affirmed the finding of a violation (although it reversed part of the panel’s ruling) in January 2001.125 Had the United
States not defended its measure under the Safeguards Agreement, it
could have continued the dispute resolution process by requesting a
compliance panel. Even in the absence of a compliance panel, however, the United States had four months to comply (the “reasonable”
period of time).126 If the United States did not comply within that
time, then the EC would have to submit its plans for retaliation to the
DSB, and the United States could state its objections and demand an
arbitration panel to set the level of retaliation.127 Only at the end of
the arbitration process could the EC sanction the United States (and
then only so long as the United States maintained the policy).128
Yet as a safeguard action, the EC was authorized to rebalance its
concessions almost immediately.129 The Safeguards Agreement permits parties to rebalance concessions for nonconforming safeguards
without resort to the DSU procedures.130 Five days after the DSB
adopted the Appellate Body’s ruling, the EC applied duties of thirteen million euros on American exports of corn gluten, explicitly in
response to the United States’ illegal use of the wheat gluten safeguard.131 The United States filed a complaint against the EC based on
this response, but ultimately, the United States did not pursue the
123 See Dispute Settlement: Dispute DS166, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds166_e.htm (last visited Aug. 2, 2011).
124 Panel Report, United States — Wheat Gluten, WT/ DS166/R (July 31, 2000).
125 Appellate Body Report, United States — Wheat Gluten, 58–60, WT/DS166/AB/R (Dec.
22, 2000).
126 See Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Ben Goodrich, Next Move in Steel: Revocation or Retaliation?, INT’L ECON. POL’Y BRIEFS, No. PB03-10, at 5 n.8 (Peterson Inst. for Int’l Econ., Washington, D.C.), Oct. 2003, available at http://www.iie.com/publications/pb/pb03-10.pdf.
127 Formally, the arbitration panels are simply supposed to review the reasonableness of
the retaliating state’s proposal. See DSU art. 22.6. In practice, the arbitration panel has almost
always submitted an amount (or formula) that sets the maximum annual retaliation permissible.
See generally Holger Spamann, The Myth of ‘Rebalancing’ Retaliation in WTO Dispute Settlement Practice, 9 J. INT’L ECON. L. 31 (2006).
128 See supra Part I.A.
129 See Hufbauer & Goodrich, supra note 126, at 8.
130 Safeguards Agreement art. 8.2–.3.
131 The EC placed a five-euro-per-ton tariff on the first 2.73 million metric tons of corn
gluten exports from the United States (totaling 13.65 million euros). See Daniel Pruzin, U.S.
Denounces EU Retaliatory Move against Wheat Gluten Safeguard Measure, WTO Rep. Online
(BNA) (Jan. 22, 2001); see also Hufbauer & Goodrich, supra note 126, at 8.
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complaint when the parties reached an agreement regarding the original wheat gluten safeguard.132
Although the United States — Wheat Gluten episode went largely
unnoticed, similar action by the United States did receive significant
attention when it imposed steel safeguards in 2002. The United
States’ action was greeted almost immediately with a request for consultations from the EC and other states.133 In July 2003, the panel
requested by the EC circulated its ruling finding that the American
safeguard violated WTO rules.134 The United States appealed and the
Appellate Body upheld that finding in November 2003.135 Again, because the United States defended its measures as permissible safeguards, the complaining states could rebalance concessions almost
immediately. This permitted the EC to threaten credibly to rebalance
concessions before the United States could request that a compliance
panel or an arbitration panel consider the level of rebalancing under
the DSU procedures. This threat proved effective: the United States
ultimately chose to remove the safeguard by December 2003.136
The bizarre result in both of these cases is that the United States
would have been better off—in the sense that it could have maintained its measure without facing any trade consequences—by simply
violating WTO rules and not claiming that its actions were justified
under the Safeguards Agreement. Had the United States done so, it
could have delayed the EC’s credible threat of trade consequences at
least for the reasonable period of time for compliance and probably
also for as long as necessary to have a compliance panel and an appeal. In addition, the United States could have challenged the level of
trade retaliation chosen by the EC via DSU procedures, which the
United States was not able to do in the safeguard context.137 There
may be some reputational costs from taking this approach (which I
See Hufbauer & Goodrich, supra note 126, at 8.
See Edmund L. Andrews, Angry Europeans to Challenge U.S. Steel Tariffs at W.T.O.,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2002, at C12.
134 Panel Report, United States — Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain
Steel Products, WT/DS248/R (July 11, 2003).
135 Appellate Body Report, United States — Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of
Certain Steel Products, ¶ 513(e), WT/DS248/AB/R (Nov. 10, 2003).
136 The United States government stated that the economic circumstances had changed and
that the steel safeguards were no longer needed, although it also noted that a trade war was
averted by withdrawing the safeguards. See David Sanger, A Blink From the Bush Administration: Backing Down on Steel Tariffs, U.S. Strengthens Trade Group, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2003, at
A28; Corbett B. Daly, Bush Relents, Scraps Steel Tariffs, MARKETWATCH (Dec. 4, 2003, 5:35
PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/bush-relents-scraps-steel-tariffs.
137 DSU art. 22.6.
132
133
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discuss in greater detail in the next Section), but it is unclear what
additional harm the United States would have incurred by taking this
approach. In United States — Steel Safeguards, the international community widely rejected the United States’ claim that its protection of
the steel industry was covered by the Safeguard Agreement,138 so any
additional reputational cost may have been slight.
In short, the remedy gap creates a significant loophole in trade
obligations. Member states understand that they can violate WTO
rules without facing any trade consequences so long as they withdraw
the measure at the end of the adjudication process.139 Even when the
member state does not simply intend to withdraw the measure once
the issue is litigated, the remedy gap produces odd incentives. Trade
retaliation, once applied, is only prospective. As a result, a respondent state has an incentive to drag out dispute resolution for as long as
possible to lower the overall sanctions it will bear from a breach. The
next two Sections discuss two effects of having such a broad de facto
escape clause: the influence on settlement negotiations and the incentives for states to act outside of the DSU framework.
B. Pretrial Settlement Negotiations
The effects of the remedy gap extend to settlement negotiations.
Just as with domestic civil actions, the settlement of a claim depends
on the remedies available at the end of dispute resolution.140 As this
Section discusses, the remedies at the WTO effectively give the respondent state an option to maintain its challenged policy until the
end of a long dispute resolution period. Settlement is still possible,
but the respondent state will most likely have to be compensated (e.g.,
through side payments or a more favorable settlement) for not exercising this option.
In domestic civil litigation, we expect parties to want to settle
their disputes before trial. The trial itself is costly because of attorneys’ fees, so the conventional account is that that the parties will settle for the expected value of the judgment (the probability of winning
multiplied by the expected damages award, minus some proportion of
138 Andrews, supra note 133 (discussing general international rejection of the American
justification for the steel safeguards).
139 The respondent state may face some reputational harms or informal sanctions. This
Article discusses these possibilities and whether this solves the enforcement problem created by
the remedy gap in Part III.
140 Cf. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979) (discussing bargaining and settlement in the divorce
context).
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attorneys’ fees).141 Both parties are better off with a settlement because they collectively save the costs of the trial and divide that gain
between themselves.142
The same assumptions for settlement are not true for the DSU
system. The unique features of the WTO system create incentives
that are very different from the domestic (American) litigation context. At the WTO, the violating state is actually worse off settling a
case early. If the violating state receives some political benefit from
the measure (which is probable given that the measure was enacted),
then the respondent state is better off continuing the policy for as long
as possible.143 Settling the case before the end of dispute resolution
deprives the respondent of the value of the policy for the period of
dispute resolution, regardless of whether the violating state plans to
comply eventually. If the respondent state intends to remove the
measure at the end of the dispute resolution process, the expected
cost of the judgment is zero (because the complaining state is not authorized to apply any sanctions) and the respondent state gains nothing from settling.144 If the violating state does not intend to remove
the measure at the end of dispute resolution, the state can decrease
the overall level of sanctions by delaying the beginning of the sanctions, because the total cost of the sanctions over time is lower if the
start date is later.
There is still the issue of attorneys’ fees. Litigating at the WTO
can be expensive,145 particularly if the state is hiring outside counsel,146
and avoiding these costs can provide states with a reason to settle
early.147 Yet attorneys’ fees can vary dramatically based on the quality
141 William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & ECON. 61, 101–02
(1971). See generally John P. Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 279
(1973); Richard Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration,
2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1973).
142

See Landes, supra note 141, at 101–02.

See Gregory Shaffer, Developing Country Use of the WTO Dispute Settlement System:
Why It Matters, the Barriers Posed, and Its Impact on Bargaining (May 16–17, 2005) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (explaining that the WTO system creates incentives to
avoid settling).
143

144

Id.

See Marc L. Busch, Eric Reinhardt & Gregory Shaffer, Does Legal Capacity Matter? A
Survey of WTO Members, 8 WORLD TRADE REV. 559, 570–71 (2009) (discussing the perception
among WTO member governments that WTO litigation is expensive); Shaffer, supra note 143, at
21–23 (discussing the costs of private attorneys’ fees for WTO litigation).
145

146 Shaffer, supra note 143, at 21–23 (noting that a WTO case can easily cost a complaining
government over half a million dollars in private attorneys’ fees).
147

Id.
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of the legal argument.148 If the state is simply looking to delay judgment (and is not concerned about liability), then it will most likely use
government lawyers, as the marginal cost of their services is low. In
addition, developed states, which keep sophisticated lawyers on staff,
will be able to litigate cases, regardless of their legal complexity, at
very low marginal costs. Thus, attorneys’ fees may offer governments
significantly less financial motivation to settle at the WTO than they
provide private litigants in domestic cases.
Naturally, settlement may still be possible if states take the remedy rule into account when engaging in settlement negotiations.149
Here, pretrial settlement discussions should be very different from domestic civil-litigation settlement negotiations. In the case of domestic
legal disputes, we expect the responding party to compensate the complaining party for not going to trial by paying the expected value of
the judgment. Conversely, at the WTO, settlement may involve the
complaining state compensating the respondent state for settling in
advance of trial.150 DSU procedural rules effectively provide the respondent with an option to violate trade obligations until the end of
the dispute resolution process.151 To settle the case early, we should
expect the complaining state to compensate the responding state for
not exercising the option of engaging in a lengthy dispute resolution
process.152 Again, this is true regardless of whether the respondent
state plans to remove the offending measure at the end of dispute
resolution. If the responding party intends to remove the offending
policy should the WTO authorize sanctions, then the respondent state
will be motivated to settle only if it is compensated for ending its policy early.153 If the respondent state intends to reach a compromise and
alter but not entirely remove its measure, then the respondent state
148 See Bown & Hoekman, supra note 92, at 870 (dividing legal fees for WTO cases into
low- and high-complexity categories).
149 Parties can bargain around remedy rules, but these rules will influence the distribution
of the settlement. See R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 5–8 (1960).
150

See DSU arts. 3, 22, 26.

151

See id. arts. 16, 21.

Similar dynamics exist in some areas of intellectual property law. See C. Scott Hemphill, Paying For Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory Design Problem, 81
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1557–59, 1576–78 (2006) (discussing “pay-for-delay” agreements and “reverse payments”).
152

153 Analogous situations exist in other areas of international law. See, e.g., Jonathan Baert
Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal Context, 108 YALE L.J.
677, 753–54 (1999) (discussing how the parties injured by cross-national pollution may compensate the polluter to cease its activities).
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will nonetheless expect compensation (perhaps in terms of a more attractive compromise policy) for altering its policy early.
At the same time, the respondent state’s demands for compensation will make pretrial settlement politically difficult for the complaining government. In practice, it may be very hard for leaders in
the complaining state to justify to their domestic political audience a
decision to pay a respondent to comply with its trade obligations. It is
also politically difficult for the complaining state to settle for only a
partial elimination of the trade violation, effectively permitting the
continuation of the violation into the future without legal challenge.
Domestic leaders may simply prefer to take a hard line and continue
to prosecute the case, even where a settlement could theoretically be
reached. Domestic leaders might also choose to act outside of the
WTO system, an option discussed in the next Section.
The remedy gap also helps explain why complaining states have a
roughly eighty-percent win rate in front of the Appellate Body.154
Several trade scholars maintain that this high rate of success for complaining states demonstrates that the Appellate Body has a pro–freetrade bias beyond that which the WTO agreements require.155 Relying on the Priest-Klein hypothesis,156 these scholars maintain that unbiased judicial decisionmaking would result in victory for the plaintiffs
roughly fifty percent of the time. Although the Priest-Klein hypothesis is both theoretically and empirically doubtful,157 the high rate of
complaining-state victories may nonetheless seem suspiciously high
given that the parties can settle legally clear cases. But the differences
154 John Maton & Carolyn Maton, Independence Under Fire: Extra-Legal Pressures and
Coalition Building in WTO Dispute Settlement, 10 J. INT’L ECON. L. 317, 328–29 (2007).
155 Keisuke Iida, Why Does the World Trade Organization Appear Neoliberal? The Puzzle
of the High Incidence of Guilty Verdicts in WTO Adjudication, 23 J. PUB. POL’Y 1, 1–2 (2003); see
also Colares, supra note 16, at 422–38.

George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LESTUD. 1, 14–16 (1984).

156
GAL

157 Several scholars have demonstrated that as a theoretical matter, litigation should not
necessarily result in a fifty-fifty rate of success for plaintiffs and respondents. See Lucian Arye
Bebchuk, Litigation and Settlement Under Imperfect Information, 15 RAND J. ECON. 404, 413–14
(1984) (discussing variables affecting the likelihood of litigation proceeding to trial); Steven
Shavell, Any Frequency of Plaintiff Victory at Trial Is Possible, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 493 (1996).
The empirical evidence is mixed. See Daniel Kessler, Thomas Meites & Geoffrey Miller, Explaining Deviations from the Fifty-Percent Rule: A Multimodal Approach to the Selection of
Cases for Litigation, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 233 (1996); Katherine Spier, Litigation, in 1 HANDBOOK
OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 259, 326–28 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007); Joel
Waldfogel, Selection of Cases for Trial, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS
AND THE LAW 419 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
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between the domestic legal system and the WTO dispute resolution
system cast doubt on this conclusion.
The complications in the settlement process caused by the remedy gap offer an alternative explanation for why plaintiffs have a disproportionate rate of success at the WTO: states fail to settle because
of the structure of the remedy regime. The respondent state has little
reason to settle early because it faces lower overall sanctions by extending the dispute resolution process. The complaining state, for its
part, could compensate the respondent state for foregoing the dispute
resolution process but may face high domestic political costs for doing
so. As a result, states at the WTO may choose to continue the dispute
resolution process at a higher rate than parties in domestic civil litigation do, notwithstanding little uncertainly in the ultimate outcome.
The fact that there is an eighty percent rate of victory for complaining
states, if anything, suggests that many respondent states are taking advantage of the remedy gap, extending the dispute resolution process
as long as possible in situations where the legal issue may be relatively
straightforward.158
C. The Return of Unilateral Enforcement
The remedy gap also builds a demand for unilateral action into
the dispute settlement system. The structure of the DSU creates a
situation where governments that wish to deter the use of the de facto
escape option must resort to unilateral action.159 This result is perverse because the DSU was designed, in part, to quash unilateral state
enforcement actions.160 Yet the remedy gap creates a de facto escape
option because the WTO’s legal obligations and the remedy regime to
enforce those obligations overlap imperfectly. Governments inter158 For instance, the United States continues to litigate its practice of using a “zeroing”
methodology in antidumping cases even though the WTO Appellate Body has repeatedly found
this practice to be a violation of trade rules. See, e.g., Panel Report, United States — Continued
Existence and Application of Zeroing Methodology, WT/DS350/R (Oct. 1, 2008); Panel Report,
United States — Measures Relating to Zeroing and Sunset Reviews, WT/DS322/R (Sept. 30,
2006); Panel Report, United States — Laws, Regulations and Methodology for Calculating
Dumping Margins (“Zeroing”), WT/DS294/R (Oct. 31, 2005).
159 For a discussion of the importance of reciprocity in informal remedy regimes and how
formal remedy regimes can crowd out informal enforcement, see ROBERT E. SCOTT & PAUL B.
STEPHAN, THE LIMITS OF THE LEVIATHAN: CONTRACT THEORY AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006).
160 CROOME, supra note 17, at 151, 263; 2 THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING
HISTORY, supra note 18, at 2760–63, 2777–79.

2011]

THE REMEDY GAP

135

ested in enforcing WTO rules before the end of the adjudication process are left with no WTO-consistent means of doing so.161
Governments that choose to act outside of the DSU framework
are themselves violating trade rules.162 Here the difference is one between first-order rules as the substantive rules of international trade
law and second-order rules as the rules regarding the enforcement of
the first-order rules.163 The remedy gap is created by the misalignment between first-order rules—the state’s obligations to refrain from
taking certain trade actions—and second-order rules—the inability of
states to take action to address the original violation.164 Governments
that wish to increase enforcement of first-order rules will thus sometimes violate second-order rules. More specifically, governments may
act outside the WTO framework to deter states from making use of
the de facto escape option.165
Interestingly, the WTO system extends the de facto escape clause
to these actions as well.166 Under the DSU, there is no difference between violations of first-order and second-order rules (although the
reputational impact might be different).167 The only legal remedy for
the state that is the “victim” of illegal retaliation is the opportunity to
file a complaint. This complaint has to go through the same procedures as any other complaint.168 Thus the remedy gap that exists for
the violation of first-order rules (the substantive violation) also appears again when considering the violation of the second-order rule
(the unauthorized retaliation).169 The DSU system, by providing limited, prospective short-term remedies, thereby allows states to violate
trade rules and allows other states to (illegally) enforce those rules.
161 See Rachel Brewster, Shadow Unilateralism: Enforcing International Trade Law at the
WTO, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1133, 1143 (2009).
162 Id. at 1145.
163 See Beth A. Simmons, Compliance with International Agreements, 1 ANN. REV. POL.
SCI. 75, 78 (1998) (discussing first-order and second-order compliance).
164 The imperfect alignment of first-order rules and second-order remedies is well recognized in other areas of law. See, e.g., John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedies Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87 (1999); Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial
Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857 (1999).
165 Brewster, supra note 161, at 1145–46. Such actions do not necessarily have to be independent violations of first-order rules although often times they will be (e.g., violations of mostfavored nation rules). Nonetheless, these actions would still be violations of the second-order
trade rules (even if not first-order trade rules) because the action seeks to remedy substantiverule violations outside of the WTO treaties framework.
166 Id. at 1145.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 1136, 1145.
169 Id. at 1145.
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So far, states have not explicitly imposed sanctions in an attempt
to enforce WTO rules without prior authorization from the DSB. But
retaliation outside of the DSU framework does not have to be explicit
to be effective. States can simply apply “breach-for-breach” measures
against perceived violations of trade rules without drawing a specific
link to the target state’s particular policy.170 For instance, when the
United States was considering legislation that would impose a carbon
tariff on states that had not taken “adequate” steps to limit greenhouse gas emissions, many states objected to this proposal.171
Whether such a tariff would pass muster under WTO law is a matter
of much debate,172 but resort to the dispute settlement process was not
the only way in which states could have responded. States also considered enacting their own carbon tariffs targeting American exports.173
United States Trade Representative Susan Schwab explicitly warned
members of Congress about this possibility, noting that the carbon
tariff “could easily backfire,” and that “other countries could well turn
to [carbon tariffs] themselves and develop their own import restrictions, based on their own unilateral definitions of what constitutes adequate action by other countries.”174 States might also adopt less
formal measures, such as imposing delays at the border or more
health and safety inspections.
The willingness of member states to act within the bounds of the
DSU framework is crucial to the WTO’s success as an institution.175
International relations theorists emphasize that international organizations must be incentive compatible—that is, it must be in the interId. at 1142.
See, e.g., Mark Landler, Meeting Shows U.S.-India Split on Climate, N.Y. TIMES, July 20,
2009, at A6.
172 GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER, STEVE CHARNOVITZ & JISUN KIM, PETERSON INST. FOR
INT’L ECON., GLOBAL WARMING AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 39–45 (2009); see also
Joost Pauwelyn, U.S. Federal Climate Policy and Competitiveness Concerns: The Limits and Options of International Trade Law (Nicholas Inst. for Envtl. Policy Solutions, Duke Univ., Working Paper No. 07-02, 2007), available at http://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/climate/policydesign/
u.s.-federal-climate-policy-and-competitiveness-concerns-the-limits-and-options-of-international-trade-law.
173 Joe Kirwin, France to Push EU Member States to Embrace Carbon Border Taxes, 26
Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 25, at 817 (June 18, 2009) (describing the efforts of French President
Nicolas Sarkozy to have the EU implement a carbon tariff on non-Kyoto members).
174 Letter from Susan Schwab, U.S. Trade Representative, to Joe Barton, Ranking Member
of the Energy & Commerce Comm., U.S. House of Representatives (Mar. 4, 2008) (on file with
author).
175 See JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 159
(2005) (discussing potential noncompliance with the WTO structural rules for dispute
resolution).
170
171
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ests of member states to abide by the rules of the institution.176 Much
of the concern with unilateralism under the GATT system derived
from the unwillingness of the participants, particularly the United
States, to use the GATT dispute settlement system exclusively.177 The
United States did not find the GATT dispute resolution system to be
in its interests and resorted instead to unilateral use of section 301
sanctions.178 The WTO now explicitly bans such unilateral action,179
but the level of state compliance with this ban will depend, at least in
part, on the effectiveness of the DSU in providing adequate remedies
for trade policy violations.180
III.

IMPLICATIONS

FOR

WTO DISPUTE RESOLUTION

Many commentators emphasize that there are other mechanisms
besides formal trade remedies to address violations.181 The two primary alternative enforcement mechanisms are reputational costs (i.e.,
a reputation as a bad trade partner) and informal sanctions (i.e.,
colder diplomatic relations or lower levels of foreign aid). This Part
explores both alternatives and questions whether these mechanisms
can provide a sufficient level of enforcement of trade rules given the
absence of trade remedies during the dispute resolution process.
A. Reputational Concerns
Reputational concerns are commonly cited as a key reason that
states comply with international law in general182 and international
176 Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson & Duncan Snidal, The Rational Design of International Institutions, 55 INT’L ORG. 761, 768 (2001).
177 BARTON ET AL., supra note 18, at 69; 2 THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING
HISTORY, supra note 18, at 2760–63.
178 BARTON ET AL., supra note 18, at 69; CROOME, supra note 17, at 149; 2 THE GATT
URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY, supra note 18, at 2760–61.
179 DSU art. 23.2 (requiring member states not to make any unilateral determinations of
whether there has been a violation, how long a reasonable amount of time for compliance extends, or what the appropriate level of suspension of concession would be).
180 GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 175, at 159 (questioning whether the WTO will be
any more successful than the GATT in restraining unilateral retaliation).
181 Joost Pauwelyn, The Calculation and Design of Trade Retaliation in Context: What is the
Goal of Suspending WTO Obligations, in THE LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS OF RETALIATION IN WTO DISPUTE RESOLUTION 34, 59 (Chad P. Bown & Joost Pauwelyn eds., 2010);
Schwartz & Sykes, supra note 1, at S194.
182 GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 175, at 101; ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY 100 (2008); MICHAEL TOMZ, REPUTATION
AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: SOVEREIGN DEBT ACROSS THREE CENTURIES 223 (2007);
Kal Raustiala, Form and Substance in International Agreements, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 581, 609
(2005); Beth A. Simmons, International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance
in International Monetary Affairs, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 819, 819 (2000).
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trade law in particular.183 Governments want to maintain a good reputation for complying with international trade law so that they can
demonstrate that they are good trade partners.184 Even if there are
few formal consequences for violating international trade rules,
reputational concerns may nonetheless lead governments to decide
that the costs of violating trade law are greater than the corresponding
benefits.185 Certainly, reputational concerns are a factor in a government’s calculus of whether or not to comply with WTO rules. From
the perspective of minimizing the remedy gap, however, the crucial
question is how reputational costs are incurred.186
Within the WTO process, there are several different stages where
a state might incur a reputational cost. The request for the establishment of a panel (or even a request for consultations) could result in
reputational harm to the respondent state because this action provides
information to other states that the respondent has adopted a controversial policy. This reputational cost is likely to be low, however, because of the uncertainty of the signal; the respondent state might
prevail once the merits of the case are considered. The reputational
costs are most likely higher if the respondent state is found to be in
violation of the WTO Agreements by either a panel or the Appellate
Body. Yet even these reputational costs may be moderate. Member
states use the DSU in good faith to resolve differences and clarify
their trade obligations.187 If a respondent state subsequently complies
with the WTO decision, it may still incur some reputational harm but
will generally maintain its status as a good trade partner.188 The greatest reputational costs are incurred if the respondent state refuses to
comply with the WTO decision after the dispute resolution process is
complete.189 Here the potential reputational loss is greatest because
the respondent state is continuing to act outside of the WTO legal
framework.190
Pauwelyn, supra note 181, at 59; Schwartz & Sykes, supra note 1, at S196–98.
See GUZMAN, supra note 182, at 110; Schwartz & Sykes, supra note 1, at S196.
185 See GUZMAN, supra note 182, at 75–76.
186 The question of how reputation functions between governments and across issue areas
is surprisingly difficult to answer. See Rachel Brewster, Unpacking the State’s Reputation, 50
HARV. INT’L L.J. 231, 237–38, 243–44 (2009); George W. Downs & Michael A. Jones, Reputation, Compliance, and International Law, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S95, S101–02 (2002).
187 Charnovitz, supra note 6.
188 See Judith Hippler Bello, Editorial Comment, The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: Less is More, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 416, 417 (1996).
189 See id.
190 Even in this situation, the reputational harm to the respondent state depends on how
the observing state understands the breach. If the observing state has an “efficient breach/com183
184
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In terms of minimizing the effects of the remedy gap, the relevant
question is how reputational costs are incurred while the dispute resolution process is continuing (not at the end of the dispute resolution
process). As discussed above, reputational costs are modest at this
stage. The respondent state may have an adverse decision from a
panel or the Appellate Body but is not acting outside of the WTO
framework. Indeed, the respondent state can comply at the end of the
dispute resolution process (and thus avoid the greatest reputational
costs) and yet take full advantage of the remedy gap. Because a state
does not have to refuse to comply with the WTO ruling to gain the
advantages of delaying the DSU process, reputational costs are unlikely to be particularly helpful in closing the remedy gap.191 There
may be some reputational harm from the adverse panel decision or
Appellate Body ruling, but this is unlikely to be a significant enough
cost to the respondent state to resolve the problems created by the
remedy gap.
A respondent state could also develop a poor reputation as a
trading partner if other member states believed the respondent state
was abusing the dispute resolution process—for example, by systematically delaying proceedings in bad faith. This requires a much more
contextual analysis by the observing state than detecting continued
noncompliance. If a respondent state refuses to comply with a WTO
ruling, this is a fairly transparent act.192 Questions of abuse of the
dispute resolution process are far less transparent; the respondent
state may or may not be to blame if the dispute resolution process is
delayed or otherwise continues for a long period of time. To determine if there is abuse, the observing state has to have more information about the dispute and the actions of the parties to it.193 The lack
pensate” view of WTO dispute settlement—where the respondent state can legitimately refuse
to comply with WTO decisions so long as the complaining party is allowed to readjust its concessions—then the reputational harm may be minimal here as well. See id. at 416–17; see also
Sykes, supra note 28, at 354–55. But see John H. Jackson, Editorial Comment, The WTO Dispute
Settlement Understanding—Misunderstandings on the Nature of Legal Obligation, 91 AM. J. INT’L
L. 60, 60–61 (1997).
191 See supra Part I.A.
192 See Andrew T. Guzman, The Cost of Credibility: Explaining Resistance to International
Dispute Resolution Mechanisms, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 303, 311 (2002) (discussing how international courts can heighten the reputational costs to a state by making its violation more transparent); Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational
Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 276 (1997) (same); Alexander Thompson, The Rational Enforcement of International Law: Solving the Sanctioners’ Dilemma, 1 INT’L THEORY 307 (2009)
(discussing how international court rulings can decrease the potential reputational costs to a
sanctioner by clarifying the initial violation).
193 See infra Part IV.B.
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of transparency in this situation means that the observing state will be
less certain of its conclusions, which lowers the reputational costs to
the respondent. Nonetheless, it remains possible for a respondent
state to suffer some reputational loss in this situation.
In short, reputational costs are uncertain in dispute resolution
and may not be sufficient to mitigate the effects of the remedy gap.
Reputational costs may indeed be an important part of trade law enforcement, but these costs are most effective when a state refuses to
comply with a WTO ruling at the end of the dispute resolution process. Yet these “noncompliance” reputational costs will not solve the
problems raised by the remedy gap. Respondent states can make use
of the delay in the DSU system and still fully comply with the WTO
ruling at the end of the day.
B. Informal Sanctions
States can enforce trade rules without resorting to formal WTO
procedures through informal sanctions. The scope of informal sanctions is wide, ranging from mild actions, such as cooler diplomatic relations, to more severe actions, such as a reduction of foreign aid or a
refusal to share security intelligence.194 Informal sanctions can also
resemble a formal sanctioning system, although without the imprimatur of multilateral approval.195 For example, the United States
section 301 sanctioning system, though highly formalized as a matter
of American law, was an informal sanctioning system in the realm of
international law because it was applied outside of the GATT dispute
settlement framework.196
The use of informal sanctions can serve as an effective trade enforcement regime if the sanctions are sufficiently high.197 However,
the informal sanctions raise two significant concerns. First, the
strength of informal sanctions is highly correlated with the power of
the complaining state. A threat to restrict market access will generally
have far more deterrent power if it comes from a state with a large
domestic market than a similar threat coming from a state with a
smaller domestic market.198 Although this difference in sanctioning
See DAVID A. BALDWIN, ECONOMIC STATECRAFT 109 (1985).
Multilateral approval of sanctions can be quite important to the success of the sanctioning regime. See Daniel W. Drezner, Bargaining, Enforcement, and Multilateral Sanctions: When
Is Cooperation Counterproductive?, 54 INT’L ORG. 73, 76, 88 (2000).
196 See Bhagwati, supra note 20, at 2–3.
197 See Alan O. Sykes, Constructive Unilateral Threats in International Commercial Relations: The Limited Case for Section 301, 23 L. & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 263, 316–17 (1992).
198 Brewster, supra note 23, at 257–58.
194
195
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power still exists within the WTO system, the DSU performs an important function in setting the appropriate level of sanctions and restricting threats of counter-retaliation.199 Second, the use of informal
sanctions is unconnected to the legal merits of the case. Informal
sanctions can be used to deter government policies that are legal
under WTO rules or even to deter states from bringing legitimate
complaints to the WTO. A robust informal sanctioning regime tilts
closer to a power-based dispute resolution system than a rules-based
system.200
For these reasons, the current trend in international trade law is
to restrict, not encourage, the use of informal sanctions. Indeed, much
of the motivation to establish the DSU came from a desire to restrict
informal sanctions.201 The EC and Japan supported the creation of the
DSU as a means of curtailing the United States’ use of section 301
sanctions.202 More recently, the Appellate Body has restricted developed states’ ability to use the Generalized System of Preferences
(“GSP”) to sanction developing states (although it adopted a standard
that was less restrictive than the standard the panel established).203 In
the European Communities — Tariff Preferences case, the Appellate
Body required developed states to set “objective criteria” for granting
GSP benefits, thereby curtailing a developed state’s ability to restrict
the GSP benefits of a targeted developing state.204 By curbing the use
of informal sanctions, member states and the DSB place increasingly
more of the burden of trade law enforcement on the formal sanctioning system. Although some informal means of sanctioning remain,
such as lower levels of cooperation on monetary policy or security is199

See id. at 258.

200

JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW
ECONOMIC RELATIONS 109–11 (2d ed. 1997).
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See CROOME, supra note 17, at 151.
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See supra Part I.A.
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POLICY
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See generally Appellate Body Report, European Communities — Conditions for the
Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, WT/DS246/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2004).
203

204 For discussion of this case, see Lorand Bartels, Conditionality in GSP Programmes: The
Appellate Body Report in European Communities — Conditions for Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries and its Implications for Conditionality in GSP Programmes, in
HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 463, 467–68 (Thomas Cottier et al. eds., 2005);
Robert Howse, India’s WTO Challenge to Drug Enforcement Conditions in the European Community Generalized System of Preferences: A Little Known Case with Major Repercussions for
“Political” Conditionality in US Trade Policy, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 385 (2003); and Gregory C.
Shaffer & Yvonne Apea, Institutional Choice in the General System of Preferences Case: Who
Decides the Conditions for Trade Preferences? The Law and Politics of Rights, 39 J. WORLD
TRADE 977 (2005).
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sues, eliminating unilateral trade-related sanctions removes one of the
most potent weapons from a state’s enforcement arsenal.205
It is hard to judge whether there is sufficient enforcement of
trade rules when the DSU system fails to offer a remedy.206 As this
Part reviews, it is theoretically possible for states to achieve sufficient
enforcement of international trade rules even where formal trade retaliation is not authorized by the WTO, but these conditions are unlikely to exist in most cases. The WTO system has purposefully
restricted informal trade sanctions and thereby limited their effectiveness.207 Although reputational costs and informal enforcement tools
can be good supplements to the formal WTO dispute resolution regime, it is difficult to rely on either as an adequate replacement for the
formal trade retaliation system.
IV. PROPOSALS

FOR

CLOSING

THE

REMEDY GAP

The current remedy gap can be addressed in a number of different ways, depending on which institutional players choose to act and
what remedies are considered. Naturally the range of possible solutions is broad; the dispute resolution system could be entirely renegotiated if governments so chose. This Part focuses on three possible
reforms. The first is to authorize the award of unconditional and retrospective damages—the approach taken by domestic contract law.208
This reform, although a step forward, comes with two significant costs.
First, governments may not react to the threat of large damage awards
at the end of a litigation process in the way rational individuals or
profit-maximizing firms do. Although firms may alter their present
behavior to account for a damage award that would materialize many
years later, governments often have shorter time horizons. Thus, a
government may prefer, quite rationally, to continue to accrue the
present benefits of the program if it suspects that a successor government will bear the costs of the retaliation award. Second, a system of
unconditional and retrospective damages would allow a complaining
state to retaliate even if the respondent state complies with the
WTO’s ruling. This could have a chilling effect on governments’ policy choices, leading governments to forego novel but WTO-consistent
205 See Daniel W. Drezner, The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion, 57 INT’L ORG. 643,
643–45 (2003) (discussing the effectiveness of economic coercion).
206 The very idea of “sufficient enforcement” requires us to know what levels of trade compliance states find optimal.
207 See Howse, supra note 204, at 386–87.
208 See infra Part IV.A.
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policies. This effect is especially problematic in developing countries,
where, although innovative government policies could be particularly
beneficial, the potential costs of trade retaliation are also quite high.
The second proposal seeks to account for the government’s
shorter time horizons.209 The proposal allows a complaining government to seek a preliminary injunction at the start of the WTO litigation. If the complaining state is likely to succeed on the merits of the
case, the panel hearing the complaint could issue an injunction, ordering the respondent state to suspend its challenged policy until the end
of the litigation process. If the respondent state refused to suspend its
policy, then the complaining state would be authorized to begin retaliation for the damages it incurs during the litigation process. This proposal permits retaliation before a government’s policy has been
authoritatively determined to be a violation of the WTO, but it provides a remedy for likely violations of trade rules that are effective
against the current government.
The third proposal is the most modest but the easiest to
achieve.210 This proposal is simply to change the sequencing of when
retaliation can be authorized in the WTO litigation process. The
WTO text is ambiguous regarding whether retaliation can be authorized before the compliance stage of dispute settlement. The current
practice is to wait until the end of the compliance stage, but the Appellate Body could clarify that retaliation can be requested at the end
of the merits stage. This would not eliminate the remedy gap but
would mitigate some of the gap’s negative effects.
A. Establishing Retrospective and Unconditional Retaliation
One approach is to alter the WTO’s remedy rules to more closely
resemble domestic contract law. There are two aspects to the WTO’s
current remedy system that diverge from that model. First, the trade
retaliation is prospective from the end of the dispute resolution process.211 Second, trade retaliation is conditional, imposed only as long
as the respondent state fails to come into compliance with a WTO
ruling.212 Both of these aspects of the remedy regime create the remedy gap, and only by altering both rules can the remedy gap be closed.
The WTO member states could alter the text of the DSU agreement to include a different set of remedies, vesting the DSB with the
209
210
211
212

See
See
See
See

infra Part IV.B.
infra Part IV.C.
supra Part II.B.
supra Part II.B.
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power to authorize retrospective and unconditional retaliation.213
Under this system, successful complaining states could request the authorization to retaliate for all of the damages they have suffered from
the violating policy.214 Damages would still be limited to the respondent state’s losses (as compared to the net economic losses to the
world) traceable to the violating policy. This approach would not necessarily deter all breaches of WTO rules, as the violating state may
receive a political gain from the violation that exceeds the costs of
retaliation.215 Nevertheless, this remedy rule should deter states from
violating WTO rules more often (or lead them to settle WTO disputes
more often) than the current system of prospective and conditional
retaliation. All things being equal, the greater the potential penalty
for violation, the less often states will find violations to be
advantageous.216
It is possible that a complaining state would not wish to retaliate
once the respondent state has complied with the WTO’s ruling. Trade
commentators frequently point out that trade retaliation results in a
net economic loss for the sanctioning state,217 although retaliation in
intellectual property contexts may be economically beneficial to the
sanctioning state.218 Although this is generally true, governments may
213 Currently, the DSU text only permits retaliation only as a last resort when the respondent state has failed to comply with the WTO’s ruling. See DSU arts. 22.1, 26.
214 Such a policy creates some novel issues, such as the timing of retrospective retaliation.
Under the current system, prospective retaliation is authorized on an annual basis—the complaining state can retaliate each year for the damages it is suffering that year. See supra note
127. The switch to retrospective damages creates some questions about when the retrospective
damages should be permitted. For instance, whether the complaining state should be able to
apply retrospective retaliation all in one year, several years, or the same number of years that
the violation occurred. None of these issues, however, is particularly daunting.
215 The remedy of full compensation to complaining states does deter all “inefficient
breaches” of WTO rules. The violating policy may affect many states, resulting in economic
(and political) losses in several WTO members, but only states that formally register a complaint
at the WTO can request retaliation. If all of these states complained and were authorized by the
WTO to retaliate, this could, in theory, deter all but (economically) inefficient breaches. However, many injured states may not complain for a variety of reasons including legal capacity, the
costs of litigation, or diplomatic concerns. See supra Part II.B.
216 There is abundant literature addressing the idea of using damages to deter undesirable
government action. See Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An
Economic Analysis, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 569, 571 (1984); Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731,
1788–89 (1991); Michael A. Heller & James E. Krier, Deterrence and Distribution in the Law of
Takings, 112 HARV. L. REV. 997, 999 (1999).
217 VAN DEN BOSSCHE, supra note 94, at 223 (noting that “[r]etaliation measures are trade
destructive and the injured party imposing these measures is also negatively affected by these
measures”).
218 See Rachel Brewster, The Surprising Benefits to Developing Countries of Linking Inter-
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nonetheless gain politically from enacting barriers to trade.219 Thus if
the government is given the option of offering greater protection for a
key national industry, such as steel or agriculture, the authorization to
raise barriers to trade can be a valuable political commodity for many
governments.220 If nothing else, the threat to use the right to retaliate
can serve as a bargaining chip for the complaining state, increasing the
state’s ability to gain concessions in trade or other issue areas. For
instance, the Brazilian government was able negotiate annual payments of $147 million in assistance to refrain from applying WTO authorized sanctions.221
This revised remedy system, which could potentially close the
remedy gap, has two significant drawbacks. The first is that this system continues to delay the penalty to governments until the litigation
is over. While profit-maximizing firms may be indifferent to incurring
a penalty earlier or later with the correct rate of interest on the
award,222 governments do not respond to penalties in the same way.223
Government leaders may have systematically shorter time horizons
than firms, and prefer to push the costs of trade violations onto future
governments.224 Although a state (qua state) lives on indefinitely, the
government that acts for a state generally expects to lose power sometime in the foreseeable future.225 This is particularly true with democnational Trade and Intellectual Property, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 41–45 (2011); see also Henning
Grosse Ruse-Khan, A Pirate of the Caribbean? The Attraction of Suspending TRIPS Obligations, 11 J. INT’L ECON. L. 313, 336–38 (2008); Arvind Subramanian & Jayashree Watal, Can
TRIPS Serve as an Enforcement Device for Developing Countries in the WTO?, 3 J. INT’L ECON.
L. 403, 405 (2000).
219 See Schwartz & Sykes, supra note 1 at S202; see also Sykes, supra note 104, at 259–60.
220 See Sykes, supra note 104, at 259–60.
221 Ed Taylor, Brazil Suspends Sanctions Against U.S. Until 2012 in WTO Cotton Subsidy
Dispute, 27 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 25, at 950 (June 24, 2010) (discussing how the Brazilian
government agreed to this side payment until the U.S. farm bill was reconsidered by Congress).
222 In reality, firms are probably not profit maximizing over the long term unless managers’
compensation is tied to the firm’s long-term performance. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M.
Fried, Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 71, 73 (2003); Lucian
A. Bebchuck & Jesse M. Fried, Pay Without Performance: An Overview of the Issues, 30 J. CORP.
L. 647, 664 (2005).
223 See Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of
Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 354–57 (2000) (discussing how governments do not
respond as firms do to financial penalties); Jide Nzelibe, The Credibility Imperative: The Political
Dynamics of Retaliation in the World Trade Organization’s Dispute Resolution Mechanism, 6
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 215, 222–28 (2005) (discussing the effectiveness of WTO sanctions
as a political matter).
224 For a discussion of the importance of time horizons in international relations, see Robert Axelrod & Robert O. Keohane, Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions, 38 WORLD POL. 226, 232–33 (1985).
225 Brewster, supra note 186, at 250.
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racies, where regular elections bring new coalitions of leaders to
power every several years; the current government may accrue the
gains from a violation and expect that the penalty will be borne by a
successor government.226 It is less true in nondemocracies, where a
leader may expect to maintain power for a decade or more, although
these leaders may view their tenure probabilistically and thus significantly discount potential costs that will not materialize for several
years.227
Because governments have shorter time horizons than we would
expect from a unitary state, a remedy regime of retrospective and unconditional sanctions may be significantly less effective than expected.
Although a firm (or our conception of a unitary state) may internalize
the expected costs of future sanctions today, governments will be less
likely to do so.228 The expected costs of retaliation to an incumbent
government are not zero, but they are significantly discounted because the government actor making the decision today may expect
that they will not be the actor bearing the costs of the sanctions in the
future.229 As a result, governments may continue to have an incentive
to maintain their violation of WTO rules and drag out litigation for as
long as possible. Indeed, the addition of retrospective damages increases this incentive because governments understand that they can
no longer avoid sanctions even if they ultimately comply with the
WTO ruling.
This lack of a necessary connection between the government that
violates trade rules and the government that will ultimately bear the
trade sanctions relates to the second drawback of this approach: a system of unconditional remedies severs the link between trade retaliation and the respondent state’s continued noncompliance with WTO
rules. Of course, there need not be any link between sanctions and
continued noncompliance. If sanctions are the functional equivalent
of compensatory damages, then whether the respondent state is continuing to violate WTO rules is irrelevant, except to the extent that
the damages may be higher the longer the violation continues.230 But
forging a link between sanctions and continued noncompliance is rele226 See Andrew Moravcsik, Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Integration: A Rejoinder, 33
J. COMMON MARKET STUD. 611, 622 (1995); cf. Beth V. Yarbrough & Robert M. Yarbrough,
Reciprocity, Bilateralism, and Economic ‘Hostages’: Self-Enforcing Agreements in International
Trade, 30 INT’L ST. Q. 7, 17 (1986).
227 See Brewster, supra note 186, at 249–53.
228 Id. at 250.
229 Id. at 250–51.
230 See Sebastian, supra note 28, at 365–67 (discussing the various goals of WTO remedies).
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vant if sanctions are viewed as a means of compelling a respondent
state to end its violation of WTO rules.231 Seen through this lens, the
justification for sanctions is dependent on respondent-state intransigence.232 The latter approach is the one currently taken by the
WTO—sanctions are permitted only as temporary measures and are
available only if the rulings and recommendations of the WTO are not
implemented by the respondent state233—but it is not a necessary element of an international remedy regime.234
The wisdom of altering the remedies available through the WTO
is much debated, but nearly all trade scholars argue that WTO rules
should remain conditional on the state’s refusal to comply with the
WTO’s ruling.235 Trade retaliation is the primary remedy of the system because it is a self-help mechanism—the complaining state can
impose the sanction without the respondent state’s consent, as compared to a financial remedy, which would require the respondent
state’s participation236—but sanctions are disfavored because they
See id. at 365.
See id. at 365–67
233 DSU art. 22.1 (“Compensation and the suspension of concessions or other obligations
are temporary measures available in the event that the recommendations and rulings are not
implemented within a reasonable period of time. However, neither compensation nor the suspension of concessions or other obligations is preferred to full implementation of a recommendation to bring a measure into conformity with the covered agreements. Compensation is
voluntary and, if granted, shall be consistent with the covered agreements.”)
234 The resolution of this debate depends in large part on what the goal of WTO remedy
regime should be, an issue that is also unresolved by the DSU text and contested by international-trade scholars. For a review of various goals for WTO remedies, see Pauwelyn, supra note
181; Sebastian, supra note 28; and Alan O. Sykes, Optimal Sanction in the WTO: The Case for
Decoupling (and the Uneasy Case for the Status Quo), in THE LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS
OF RETALIATION IN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 339 (Chad P. Bown & Joost Pauwelyn eds.,
2010).
235 Scholars have advanced several types of proposals for remedy reforms, all based on the
idea that sanction should be conditional. See Kyle Bagwell, Petros C. Mavroidis & Robert W.
Staiger, Auctioning Countermeasures in the WTO, 73 J. INT’L ECON. 309, 327–31 (2007) (advocating a system where states can trade the authorization to retaliate); Marco Bronckers & Naboth van den Broek, Financial Compensation in the WTO: Improving the Remedies of WTO
Dispute Settlement, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 101, 109–11 (2005) (advocating financial compensation
remedy regime); Charnovitz, supra note 6, at 823–31 (suggesting the WTO end the use of trade
sanctions as retaliation); Joost Pauwelyn, Note, Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO:
Rules Are Rules—Toward a More Collective Approach, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 335, 342–45 (2000)
(suggesting that states collectively apply DSB-approved trade sanctions). Not all scholars have
supported the idea of reform. See Jide Nzelibe, The Case Against Reforming the WTO’s Enforcement Mechanism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 319, 349–56 (defending the WTO’s bilateral sanctioning approach); Sykes, supra note 234, at 350–54 (defending the WTO remedy regime’s
failure to compensate private parties harmed by trade violations).
236 States could demand a bond in anticipation of later damages awards, although states
would almost certainly have to refill the bond at some point. Nzelibe, supra note 235, at 319–21.
231
232
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raise additional barriers to trade.237 Although trade sanctions may
provide political benefits to the sanctioner, they can impose economic
losses on both states and fail to compensate the private actors within
the complaining state who are harmed by the violation.238
The shift to a retrospective and unconditional remedy regime has
other costs and benefits. There is a possibility that a compensatory
level of sanctions could have a chilling effect on national policies that
present novel issues of WTO law.239 Some governments that are particularly averse to the possibility of sanctions may refrain from adopting national policies that would lead to a WTO complaint (even if the
policy would most likely be deemed acceptable under WTO rules)
simply to avoid the risk of trade retaliation. This may be true even
when the government discounts the value of the future sanctions: the
expected level of sanctions (even discounted) may be sufficient to deter national trade policies that are legal under WTO rules. This is
particularly the case with developing nations that have less trade surplus with which to bear trade sanctions than do developed states. On
the positive side, such a change would prevent member states from
violating trade rules without remedy for several years.
Some scholars have advocated maintaining the conditional nature
of the WTO remedy regime while shifting from prospective to retrospective damages.240 On first examination, authorizing retrospective
damages appears to close the remedy gap by eliminating the incentive
to drag out dispute resolution.241 As this Section discusses, however,
the incentive to delay remains unless both the prospective damages
rule and the conditionality requirement are altered. The addition of
retrospective damages alone may increase compliance, but it does not
eliminate the remedy gap. To understand this difference, consider
three types of respondent states: one type that plans to end its violation before the DSB authorizes trade retaliation (the compliance
type), a second type that plans to continue its violation after the dispute resolution process is complete (the noncompliant type), and a
Bronckers & van den Broek, supra note 235, at 121.
Charnovitz, supra note 6, at 813–16.
239 For a discussion on chilling effects as over-deterrence, see Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk
and the First Amendment: Unraveling the “Chilling Effect,” 58 B.U. L. REV. 685 (1978).
240 Bronckers & van den Broek, supra note 235, at 121; William J. Davey, Compliance
Problems in WTO Dispute Settlement, 42 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 119, 125 (2009); Naboth van den
Broek, Power Paradoxes in Enforcement and Implementation of World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Reports: Interdisciplinary Approaches and New Proposals, 37 J. WORLD TRADE
127, 134 (2003).
241 See Bronckers & van den Broek, supra note 235, at 110 (discussing how retrospective
damages can decrease the incentive for “foot-dragging” in WTO dispute resolution).
237
238
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third type whose compliance depends on the level of sanctioning (the
cost-benefit type).
For the compliance type, the addition of retrospective damages
does not change the state’s calculus at all. Because of the conditional
aspect of the WTO’s remedy regime, the compliance type understands
that there will be no trade retaliation if the state complies with the
ruling of the DSB. The state can comply after the initial adjudication
phase or after the compliance phase of the dispute settlement and
never face any trade consequences. As a result, the addition of retrospective damages does not alter the compliance type’s calculus because the state plans on avoiding trade retaliation altogether;
retrospective damages do not interfere with this strategy. The level of
retaliation is unimportant in this scenario; for the compliance-type
state, the remedy gap continues to exist and it continues to create a de
facto escape clause. In addition, the compliance-type state does not
have an incentive to settle unless the complaining state offers a side
payment to resolve the issue faster.
For the noncompliance-type state, the change in the remedy rule
from prospective to retrospective damages does not necessarily
change the settlement calculus, but it does remove the remedy gap.
The noncompliance type cannot avoid trade retaliation entirely (because the violation will not be withdrawn at the end of dispute resolution) and thus will eventually face higher levels of trade retaliation
under this remedy rule. But the noncompliance type does not gain
anything by settling the case early. The respondent state has a choice
between expediting dispute resolution and facing a lower level of
trade retaliation sooner or dragging out dispute resolution and facing
a higher level of trade retaliation in future years. Given that the overall levels of trade retaliation remain the same regardless of when they
are imposed, the respondent state’s decision will likely turn on other
factors. Costs associated with dispute resolution, such as attorneys’
fees, can be significant.242 If the attorneys’ fees for the respondent are
high (because it is hiring outside counsel), then there will be a greater
incentive to expedite dispute resolution. However, if the marginal
costs of the respondent state’s attorneys’ fees are low (because it is
using government lawyers), then such costs are less likely to influence
the state’s decisionmaking calculus. The government may also prefer
delay for political reasons, such as pushing the costs of retaliation onto
a successor government. Thus, although the incentives against settle242 The issue of attorneys’ fees is also relevant for the complaining state. The complaining
state may make a more generous settlement offer if their attorneys’ fees are high.
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ment and in favor of delay remain, the remedy gap is closed for this
type because the respondent state cannot delay compliance without
trade consequences.
The cost-benefit–type respondent state will base its decision of
whether or not to comply with the DSB’s ruling on the level of trade
retaliation it will face. For instance, the respondent state will comply
with the ruling if trade sanctions are greater than some level, say $100
million in trade retaliation per year. The inclusion of retrospective
damages will increase the expected level of trade retaliation in every
case, so the probability of compliance will increase as well. The inclusion of retrospective damages thus makes this type of respondent
state, on the whole, more likely to comply with DSB rulings at the end
of the dispute resolution process. However, it also gives the states an
incentive to extend the dispute resolution process for as long as possible (in order to make full use of the free violation period) and,
thereby, makes the states more likely to take advantage of the remedy
gap.243
B. Preliminary Injunctions
An alternative approach is to vest dispute resolution panels with
the power to issue preliminary injunctions ordering the respondent
state to suspend the challenged policy until the end of the litigation
process. This remedy regime better addresses the issue of governments’ shorter time horizons. Rather than postponing the remedy until the end of the (potentially lengthy) dispute resolution process, the
complaining state could request the ability to retaliate immediately if
the respondent state refused to comply with the injunction. This alternative would also maintain the link between sanctions and the respondent state’s noncompliance with WTO rulings. The respondent state
can avoid any liability for potential violations simply by complying
with the injunction. This approach also has drawbacks, namely that
the procedure might interfere with domestic legislative prerogative
prior to a formal finding of violation. On the whole, however, this
approach potentially offers the most effective way to improve compliance with WTO rules.
243 Similarly, altering just the conditions for the trade retaliation rule—that is, keeping prospective damages but making those sanctions unconditional and applicable even when the state
complies after the dispute resolution process—does not close the remedy gap. It would allow
trade retaliation in cases where the effects of the violation go on after the violation has ended—
for instance, a one-time illegal subsidy—but only for the effects that remain after the dispute
resolution process is complete. Like the current remedy regime, this formulation does not provide a remedy for damages realized during the dispute resolution process.
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Preliminary injunctions are a common aspect of domestic legal
systems,244 allowing plaintiffs to request that the court order the defendant to desist from some behavior before the merits of the case are
fully adjudicated.245 Generally a court will grant a preliminary injunction when the remedy after the trial is unlikely to make the plaintiff
whole.246 This standard is, in turn, based on the likelihood that the
plaintiff will succeed on the merits, the “irreparable” nature of the
plaintiff’s injury, and the injunction’s potential injury to the
defendant.247
A preliminary injunction procedure at the WTO would function
in a slightly modified manner. All violations of WTO rules would presumptively result in “irreparable” harm to the complaining state. This
presumption is justified, as infringements of trade rules generally do
produce irreparable effects on markets. Government policies change
the structure of an industry, leading some firms to expand production
in one area (i.e., firms may expand into a new product line if they are
given a government subsidy) and other firms to invest in other areas
(i.e., foreign firms not receiving the subsidy may choose not to compete in that product market even if the firm would otherwise be the
low cost producer).248 Firms may even go out of business if they lose
access to key foreign markets even temporarily. These effects are not
eliminated when the respondent government changes its policy several
years later. The now-defunct government program will have resulted
in changed market conditions, and nations rarely attempt to claw back
the benefits to private firms once distributed. Even if a claw back is
attempted, the private firms benefiting from the government program
may retain first-mover advantages or other relational advantages with
customers or suppliers.249 In addition, the remedy the WTO offers to
244 See generally Richard R.W. Brooks & Warren F. Schwartz, Legal Uncertainty, Economic Efficiency, and the Preliminary Injunction Doctrine, 58 STAN. L. REV. 381 (2005); Thomas
R. Lee, Preliminary Injunctions and the Status Quo, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 109 (2001); John
Leubsdorf, The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 525 (1978); Lea P.
Vaughn, The Need for Clarity: Towards a New Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 68 OR. L.
REV. 839 (1989). The TRIPS Agreement of the WTO requires all members to make preliminary
injunctions available as a domestic remedy for infringement of intellectual property. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights arts. 44, 50, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299.
245 Leubsdorf, supra note 244, at 525.
246 See id. at 541.
247 Vaughn, supra note 244, at 839.
248 See Warren F. Schwartz & Eugene W. Harper, Jr., The Regulation of Subsidies Affecting
International Trade, 70 MICH. L. REV. 831, 840 (1972).
249 See Dennis C. Mueller, First Mover Advantages and Path Dependence, 15 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 827, 828 (1997).
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the complaining state is not compensatory. If the complaining state
succeeds in its suit, then it receives no compensation if the respondent
state removes the policy and only the right to retaliate if the respondent state does not. Neither of these outcomes will make the complaining state whole. Thus the complaining state’s harm is irreparable
even if the state prevails on its claim.
The key issue for the panel to decide would be whether the net
harm to the complaining state of bearing the injury (the injury to the
complaining state multiplied by the probability of success on the merits) is greater than the net harm to the respondent state of suspending
its policy for the duration of the dispute resolution process (the injury
to the respondent state multiplied by the probability of success on the
merits).250 Were the panel to find that the net harm to the complaining state is greater, it could then order the respondent state to
suspend the challenged policy.
In the domestic context, the party requesting the injunction must
offer a bond, equal to the respondent’s harm, that is payable to the
respondent if requesting party fails to succeed on the merits. This
minimizes the expected harm to the respondent of bearing an injunction that (in hindsight) should not have been issued. In the WTO context, parties do not offer monetary compensation so a bond
requirement would be anomalous with the rest of the remedy regime
(even as damages for the initial violation). The closest equivalent to a
bond would be to allow the respondent state to suspend trade concessions against the complaining state if the injunction were issued and
the complaining state lost on the merits. However, this would also be
anomalous with the rest of the remedy regime because suspension of
concession would not be conditional on noncompliance with a WTO
order. As an alternative, if the complaining state is not successful on
the merits it could offer a series of WTO-consistent concessions to the
respondent state for a set number of years (say, as long as the injunction was in place). The panel would be free to consider such an offer
in its analysis of the potential harms each party could suffer if the
injunction issued. As in the domestic context, panels would have discretion not to order a preliminary injunction if equitable reasons existed to deny the injunction. An order for a preliminary injunction
would include a finding of how much retaliation would be allowable
should the respondent state fail to comply.
250 This would minimize the expected harms of the dispute resolution delay. See Am.
Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Hosp. Prods. Ltd., 780 F.2d 589, 593–94 (7th Cir. 1986); Vaughn, supra
note 244, at 839.
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A preliminary order would be submitted to the DSB and would
require approval by the DSB by a reverse-consensus vote to become
effective (like all other rulings from panels or the Appellate Body).251
The preliminary injunction would place a legal obligation on the respondent state to suspend the challenged policy (or the parts of the
challenged policy likely to be a violation) until the end of the litigation
period. If the respondent state failed to follow the WTO ruling, then
the complaining state would be authorized to impose prospective
(equal to the level of current harm) and conditional (dependent on
the respondent state’s failure to comply with a WTO ruling) retaliatory measures.252
A remedy regime that includes a preliminary injunction procedure has several attractive characteristics. First, the remedy regime
decreases the ability of states to game WTO dispute settlement procedures. Where a preliminary injunction is imposed, the incentive to
delay DSU proceedings is substantially weakened. If the respondent
state complies with the injunction, delay would only postpone the resolution of the dispute (and possible legal finding in favor of the respondent state).253 Should the respondent state refuse to comply with
the injunction, the complaining state can begin to rebalance its trade
relationship with the respondent state sooner. Moreover, bad faith violations of WTO rules (such as the enactment of obviously WTO-inconsistent measures in an effort to exploit the remedy gap) would be
less likely because clear violations would most likely result in a preliminary injunction. In these cases, the respondent state would not be
able to abuse the dispute resolution system to maintain its violation
for several years without consequence.
Second, a preliminary injunction procedure may be more likely to
lead to compliance with trade rules than the current system or a system of retrospective and unconditional retaliation. One significant
advantage of the preliminary injunction procedure is that it can influence the current government in the respondent state. The current sys251 The injunction order would be submitted to the DSB before the end of the panel’s
analysis of the merits. Under this proposal, the order would not be immediately reviewable by
the WTO’s Appellate Body but this is not an absolute requirement of a preliminary injunction
system. If governments became sufficiently concerned regarding the consistency or quality of
panel injunctions, then the proposal could be altered to include an immediate appeal of the
preliminary order.
252 If a preliminary injunction were granted and the panel subsequently found that the challenged policy was consistent with WTO obligations, the panel could then order a removal of the
injunction in its decision.
253 Unlike a remedy of retrospective and unconditional retaliation, the preliminary injunction would also decrease the incentive for the respondent state to drag out the litigation process.
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tem only provides a threat of retaliation in the future if the state does
not ultimately comply with the WTO ruling. Such a threat is unlikely
to influence the present government’s policy options. At the very
least, the government will be able to take advantage of a long liabilityfree period of defection from trade rules. As discussed above, a system of retrospective and unconditional retaliation would eliminate the
benefit of trade violations to the state as a whole, but would not necessarily target the current government. As a consequence, that remedy
does not necessarily incentivize the state’s present government to remove the violating provision. The more the current government discounts the threat of future retaliation, the less effective a system of
retrospective and unconditional sanctions will be in promoting
compliance.254
By contrast, a preliminary injunction puts economic and political
pressure on the current government to comply in real time. The government may still refuse to comply (or settle) because the benefits of
the violation are greater than the costs of the retaliation, but this system most effectively targets the policymakers in the respondent
state.255 In addition, a preliminary ruling on the probable outcome of
the case may make it easier for governments to settle their disputes.
The respondent government may find it is more readily able to convince its own domestic constituencies to reform the challenged program if a panel has already signaled that it will most likely find the
program to be in violation of WTO obligations.
Third, a preliminary injunction procedure is unlikely to overdeter
violations of WTO rules. The current remedy regime does not
overdeter violations of WTO rules,256 but the authorization of retrospective and unconditional damages could. The risk of overdeterrence is highest when a developing state is considering a policy that
may very well be consistent with WTO rules but creates novel WTO
issues. Here, the threat of retrospective and unconditional retaliation
(even discounted) may lead the government to be overly cautious, resulting in reduced policy space.257
A preliminary injunction system limits this risk of overdeterrence
by making a case-by-case preliminary analysis of whether a violation
exists. If the panel decides that the case is likely to be a violation,
See Axelrod & Keohane, supra note 224, at 232.
See Levinson, supra note 223, at 354–57; Nzelibe, supra note 223, at 222–28.
256 See Schwartz & Sykes, supra note 1, at S183.
257 This concern is greatest for developing countries, which are less able to absorb the costs
of trade restrictions than developed countries.
254
255
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then the government would be provided with the opportunity to suspend but continue to defend the policy without accruing liability for
the violation. In such a situation, the respondent state may continue
to provide the public good of clarifying WTO rules in an ambiguous
area.258 If the panel finds that the policy was most likely acceptable
under WTO rules, then the government could maintain the policy
without concern about accruing liability. Because retaliation would
continue to be conditional on noncompliance with WTO rules, the
government could ultimately be found to have violated trade rules
and yet avoid retaliation by complying with the final ruling.
The major drawback of this solution is also its greatest strength: a
preliminary injunction procedure may subject a respondent state to
trade sanctions before a panel makes a final determination on the consistency of the challenged policy with trade law. As a result, the respondent state may face retaliation unless it suspends its national
policy, which may ultimately be declared completely acceptable under
WTO rules.259 Setting national trade policy is an important government function and restricting this policy power on the basis of a preliminary review is not insignificant. The costs of this approach are
limited, however, by the nature of the remedy. The WTO does not
have the power to suspend the challenged policy directly. The respondent government ultimately decides whether to maintain or suspend
the policy. The major change created by the preliminary injunction
system is that the state will have to bear a higher price in terms of
trade concessions if it fails to follow the WTO’s preliminary injunction
order.
In addition, the drawbacks of the preliminary injunction system
must be weighed against the advantages of establishing such a system,
including minimizing the de facto escape clause. Ultimately, the costs
of an erroneous preliminary injunction seem to be smaller than the
costs of maintaining the current dispute settlement system, although it
is impossible to know with certainty without implementing a new rem258 See Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, On Compliance, 47 INT’L ORG. 175,
188–92, 204 (1993) (discussing the problem of ambiguity in treaty terms and highlighting the
beneficial role of dispute resolution bodies in resolving ambiguity).
259 There is also the possibility of an error in the other direction as well: the WTO may not
issue an injunction against a challenged policy that is later determined to be a violation of trade
rules. In this case, the complaining state would be without remedy until the litigation process is
complete. This is not a cost of shifting from the current system to a preliminary injunction system, however, because this cost already exists under the current system. It would be a cost of
choosing the preliminary injunction system over a retrospective and unconditional remedy
system.
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edy regime. This is an area where the states may be willing to experiment with the institutional design features of the dispute settlement
system to fix the remedy gap.
C. Resolving the Sequencing Issue: Changing the Timing of the
Article 22.6 Arbitration Panel
A more modest reform is to adjust the timing of the Article 21.5
compliance panel and the Article 22.6 remedy arbitration. The text of
the DSU is ambiguous about the sequencing of these panels, and the
most common practice now is to complete the compliance panel hearing and appeal before moving forward with the remedy arbitration.260
This significantly extends the period of time between the initiation of
the complaint and the time when the complaining party could possibly
suspend concessions.261
One way to mitigate the remedy gap would be to allow the Article 22.6 remedy arbitration to proceed concurrently with (though independently from) the Article 21.5 compliance panel. This approach
would have several benefits. It would permit the parties to have full
hearings on the merits of the complaint. In addition, it would not prevent the compliance panel from performing its function: the decision
from the compliance panel that the respondent state was in compliance with WTO rules would be sufficient to end any retaliation authorized by the Article 22.6 arbitration. The advantage is that this
reform would shorten the period of time that a respondent state could
breach trade rules without consequence. The compliance phase would
continue as before, but the respondent would have less of an incentive
to drag the proceedings out as long as possible.262 Although this reform does not eliminate the remedy gap, it quickens the progression
from the merits of a dispute to the authorization of sanctions (in the
event a violating measure was not removed).
The clearest way to achieve this goal is to have the member states
amend the text of the DSU to clarify the sequencing of arbitration and
compliance panels, although this is unlikely to occur in the near
term.263 The Appellate Body, however, might fashion a resolution to
260 See Valles & McGivern, supra note 65, at 65, 83–84 (noting the ambiguity and discussing
different sequencing models).
261 See supra Part II.
262 See Horlick & Coleman, supra note 93, at 141–42 (noting the current resistance among
states to comply with Appellate Body rulings).
263 Member states have been discussing the sequencing issue for over a decade without
resolution. See Valles & McGivern, supra note 65, at 82–83 (discussing three different and conflicting precedents on the sequencing issue).
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the member states’ stalemate; it has the institutional competence to
interpret ambiguities in the text of the WTO agreements and thus it
could provide an interpretation of what procedural sequencing the
DSU text requires.
Such an interpretation would not be unprecedented. The Appellate Body recently ruled on a similar sequencing issue in the United
States — Hormone Beef and Canada — Hormone Beef cases.264 The
EC brought complaints against the United States and Canada for continuing to suspend concessions against the EC when it issued a new,
purportedly compliant measure regarding hormone-injected beef.265
The EC interpreted the DSU agreement to require that states cease
trade retaliation when the respondent state withdraws the challenged
measure and institutes a new measure.266 In rendering its decision, the
Appellate Body was required to interpret the ambiguous DSU text to
resolve a delicate and contentious issue of procedural sequencing, the
correct timing of a compliance panel on a new measure and whether
ongoing trade retaliation should be suspended pending a ruling. The
Appellate Body rejected the contention of the EC that the United
States and Canada could not maintain their suspensions of concessions while the compliance panel on the new measure was ongoing.267
In doing so, the Appellate Body conclusively resolved this sequencing
issue: members can maintain their suspensions of concessions while
the compliance panel is ongoing. A similar approach could provide
resolution to the sequencing of Article 21.5 compliance panel and Article 22.6 remedy arbitration. States could proceed with the Article
22.6 arbitration concurrently with Article 21.5 compliance panel and
thereby significantly shorten the remedy gap.
Other relatively simple reforms are also available, including aiding panels and the Appellate Body to adhere to the deadlines set forth
in the DSU. If provided with greater resources, such as greater assistance in reviewing the parties’ briefs and evidence, then much of the
delay in issuing panel and Appellate Body reports could be reduced.
264 Appellate Body Report, Canada — Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC —
Hormones Dispute, WT/DS321/AB/R (Oct. 16, 2008); Appellate Body Report, United States —
Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC — Hormones Dispute, WT/DS320/AB/R (Oct.
16, 2008).
265 Appellate Body Report, Canada — Hormones Dispute, supra note 264, ¶ 1; Appellate
Body Report, United States — Hormones Dispute, supra note 264, ¶ 1.
266 See Appellate Body Report, Canada — Hormones Dispute, supra note 264, ¶¶ 408–09;
Appellate Body Report, United States — Hormones Dispute, supra note 264, ¶¶ 408–09.
267 See Appellate Body Report, Canada — Hormones Dispute, supra note 264, ¶ 409; Appellate Body Report, United States — Hormones Dispute, supra note 264, ¶ 409.
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Neither of these two reforms (altering the sequencing of the Article
21.5 and Article 22.6 panels, and increasing the resources available to
the DSU institutions) is a comprehensive solution, but together these
reforms may be the most promising means of at least partially closing
the remedy gap without amending the text of the DSU.
CONCLUSION
The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding was born out of a
compromise between states with different goals for the institution. A
number of states wanted a system of arbitration that would quickly
hear complaints and authorize trade retaliation. Others were less interested in establishing a rigorous adjudicatory system than in fashioning a multilateral settlement system as a means of curbing unilateral
adjudication and enforcement of trade rules. The current remedy regime reflects these mixed motives. The DSU provides for retaliation
only if the violation is not cured by the end of the dispute resolution
process, and then only prospectively. While this design limits trade
retaliation, it also creates a de facto escape clause that permits states
to violate trade rules.
The remedy gap has significant detrimental effects. Most obviously, it creates a loophole in trade obligations. States can maintain
policies that violate trade rules for several years without facing any
retaliation. In addition, the remedy gap has a counterproductive effect on settlement negotiations because it gives respondent states an
incentive to drag out dispute resolution as long as possible. It can also
encourage complaining states to act outside of the WTO framework.
States that are dissatisfied with the available remedies may resort to
unilateral sanctioning and thereby undermine the authority of the institution. This last issue is of growing importance as the dispute resolution process at the WTO grows progressively longer. States’
willingness to continue using the DSU as the exclusive means of dispute resolution in trade law depends on the institution’s ability to offer prompt and effective resolution of complaints. The greater the
remedy gap becomes, the greater the pressure to act outside the WTO
framework. A preliminary injunction is the most suitable remedy for
closing this gap because it targets the current government in the respondent state and maintains the link between retaliation and government noncompliance with WTO rulings.

